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Abstract 
When the European Union introduced a common currency, this was based 
on the assumption that there would be increasing economic convergence 
of the participating states. These expectations were not met. Instead of grad-
ually converging, the economic performance of euro area countries has 
noticeably diverged. The most considerable problem arising from this diver-
gence is that it leads to social differences and to discrepancies in political 
interests regarding further direction of economic integration. Thus, in the 
long term, the current integration model within the euro area might be 
called into question. 
Previous analyses of economic differences in the euro area have mostly 
focused on specific groups of countries, such as southern Europe versus 
northern Europe or central versus peripheral Europe. This study takes a dif-
ferent approach to the issue of convergence by looking at the three largest 
economies in the euro area: Germany, France and Italy. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Divergence and Diversity in the Euro Area. 
The Case of Germany, France and Italy 
When the European Union introduced a common 
currency, this was based on the assumption that there 
would be increasing economic convergence of the 
participating states. These expectations were not met. 
Instead of gradually converging, the economic per-
formance of euro area countries has noticeably 
diverged. The most considerable problem arising from 
this divergence is that it leads to social differences 
and to discrepancies in political interests regarding 
economic and monetary integration. Thus, in the 
long term, the existing integration model within the 
euro area might be called into question. 
Previous analyses of economic differences in the 
euro area have mostly focused on specific groups of 
countries, such as southern Europe versus northern 
Europe or central versus peripheral Europe. This 
study takes a different approach to the issue of con-
vergence by looking at the three largest economies in 
the euro area: Germany, France and Italy. There are 
good reasons for focusing on these countries when 
analysing euro area stability. Together they account 
for almost 65 percent of the euro area’s Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP) and are home to around 210 million 
of the EU-19’s 341 million citizens. All three are 
among the most important economies in the world. 
They are also the only euro area countries that belong 
to the G7 and G20 formats. Furthermore, the stability 
of Germany, France and Italy is essential for the euro 
area. A massive financial assistance package for any 
one of these countries, even if unimaginable for Ger-
many or France, would exceed the capacities of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Finally, the 
main challenge for the euro area is the sustainability 
of the economic models of the three largest econo-
mies. Italy’s economic and social problems (risks in 
the banking sector, excessive public debt, unemploy-
ment, regional differences) constitute a systemic risk 
for the currency area. Similarly, France has to imple-
ment comprehensive structural reforms. Meanwhile, 
the stability of the euro area depends heavily on the 
sustainability of the German economic model. Today, 
the Federal Republic of Germany functions as a stabi-
liser for the euro area, whereas in the late 1990s it 
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was still referred to as the “sick man of Europe” and 
was regarded as a risk for monetary integration. 
This study’s central focus is the unequal develop-
ment of the three states. The intention is not to 
clarify whether or not sustained convergence within 
the monetary union could be promoted, and how, 
but rather how to deal with limited convergence. 
The research aims to answer key questions about 
the future of the euro area. How did the significant 
differences in economic performance between the 
three countries come about? Where do divergence 
processes show themselves most clearly? Could a 
return to national currencies support the necessary 
structural reforms and convergence? And what con-
clusions can be drawn from the economic perfor-
mance of the three countries regarding current 
debates on euro area reform? This study will outline 
existing concepts of convergence before considering 
the economic systems of the three states in all their 
diversity. Thereafter, it will examine various options 
for consolidating euro area stability. 
The reasons behind the divergence cannot be ad-
equately assessed without analysing the structural 
problems of the euro area members, whose economic 
models are very heterogeneous. Differences include, 
for example, the role of the state, the quality of insti-
tutions and economic structures. They are responsible 
for the fact that membership of a common currency 
area has not brought about the hoped-for conver-
gence. Instead, the financial and euro crises have 
further exacerbated the differences. This is evident in 
both nominal and real convergence indicators, which 
measure the economic and social divergence of the 
three largest euro area countries. The most significant 
differences are in competitiveness, current account 
balances, public debt and the labour market. A com-
parison of the real per-capita GDP growth rates of the 
twelve founding members of the euro area since 1999 
shows that Italy’s deviation is greater than average. 
The economic models of Germany, France and Italy 
differ to such an extent that it is impossible to pursue 
a sustainable convergence path. Reforms in the euro 
area must therefore focus on how to stabilise the 
single currency under the conditions of limited con-
vergence between its largest economies. 
Everything suggests that there is no simple solu-
tion to further stabilising the euro area. Neither 
returning to national currencies nor federalising the 
euro area are a way out. Convergence and structural 
change will heavily depend on independent factors 
such as a positive economic environment, as well as a 
favourable political situation in the largest euro area 
members. In particular, stabilising the euro area re-
quires continuing the structural changes at member 
state level. The efficiency of state institutions must be 
improved; as recent research shows, this has a major 
influence on real convergence. The largest euro states 
should be monitored more intensively and from the 
long-term perspective within the framework of the 
European Semester – their importance for the stabil-
ity of monetary union and the difficulties associated 
with structural changes implies this. It is also essen-
tial to keep monetary policy clearly involved in the 
stabilisation process and to increasingly share risks, 
including the joint debt issuance. The ESM should be 
strengthened, especially in its role as backstop of the 
banking union. This also means increasing the ESM’s 
lending capacity. Ultimately, the euro cannot exist 
without the support of public opinion; social inte-
gration therefore needs to be further strengthened 
in the euro area. 
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Convergence and Diversity in the 
Monetary Union 
Convergence in the EU context means the alignment 
of individual member states’ economic performances. 
Sustainable convergence means that economically 
weaker countries move towards the level of stronger 
economies.1 The term divergence describes the oppo-
site: a drifting apart of states’ economic performances. 
There are different types of convergence that can 
be measured by specific indicators. Nominal conver-
gence describes harmonisation by nominal variables 
such as inflation, interest rates, budget deficit or 
public debt. This has been a condition for entry into 
the euro area since the beginning of monetary union. 
Real convergence, on the other hand, is measured in 
terms of how much a country’s general standard of 
living, working conditions, economic institutions and 
structures change for the better in comparison with 
better positioned countries.2 This study analyses the 
main aspects of real and nominal convergence using 
concrete examples relating to competitiveness, public 
finances, income levels and the labour market. There 
is a special focus on the role, efficiency and particu-
larities of national institutions. 
The wish to promote convergence has always played 
a central role in the historical development of mon-
 
1 Juan Luiz Diaz del Hoyo, Ettore Dorrucci, Frigyes Ferdi-
nand Heinz and Sona Muzikarova, Real Convergence in the 
Eurozone: A Long-Term Perspective, ECB Occasional Paper Series, 
no. 203 (Frankfurt: European Central Bank [ECB], December 
2017), 10. 
2 Robert Anderton, Ray Barrell and Jan Willem in ’t Veld, 
“Macroeconomic Convergence in Europe: Achievements and 
Prospects”, in Economic Convergence and Monetary Union in Europe, 
ed. Ray Barrell, 2ff. (London: SAGE Publications, 1991). 
etary integration. As long ago as 1974, the Council 
of the European Communities made it clear that the 
project of economic and monetary union could not 
be tackled as long as convergence in member states’ 
economic policies could not be achieved and main-
tained.3 The 1989 Delors Report, named after the then-
President of the European Commission, argued that 
a monetary union without sufficient convergence of 
national economic policies would not survive in the 
long term and could harm the Community.4 
The current EU Treaties contain references to real 
and nominal convergence. Article 3 TEU sets out 
the objective of promoting the well-being of member 
states and the “economic, social and territorial co-
hesion” between them. Article 121 para 3 TFEU pro-
vides that the Council shall monitor economic devel-
opments in each member state and in the Union in 
order to “ensure closer coordination of economic 
policies and sustained convergence of the economic 
performances of the Member States”. The only con-
crete definition of convergence provided by EU law is 
in Article 140 para 1 TFEU, which specifies the nomi-
nal convergence criteria for candidate countries for 
monetary union.5 However, exceptions have already 
 
3 Council of the European Communities, Council Decision 
of 18 February 1974 on the attainment of a high degree of 
convergence of the economic policies of the Member States 
of the European Economic Community, Brussels, 18 Feb-
ruary 1974 (74/120/EEC), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31974D0120&from=EN 
(accessed 3 July 2018). 
4 Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary 
Union, Report on Economic Monetary Union in the European Com-
munity [“Delors Report”] (Luxembourg, 12 April 1989), 28. 
5 Article 140 contains four convergence criteria: stable 
prices, stable public finances, stable participation in the 
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been made in practice. Italy, for example, was ac-
cepted as a member of the monetary union even 
though it failed the sovereign debt criterion. It was 
generally assumed that membership of the single 
currency zone would give a strong impetus to 
national economic reforms because the countries 
concerned could no longer rely on the exchange rate 
adjustment instrument.6 However, this expectation 
has not been fulfilled. Instead, a substantial number 
of the monetary union members have neglected 
urgently needed structural reforms since the intro-
duction of the euro. 
The main challenge to the smooth 
functioning of monetary union is the 
diversity of its member states. 
Convergence plays a key role in the functioning of 
monetary union. Sustainable convergence could bring 
the euro area closer to being an optimal currency 
area, which would strengthen its stability. This could 
be achieved, inter alia, by promoting worker mobility 
and fiscal transfers.7 The convergence of per capita 
incomes within the monetary union also plays a 
major role. It is not only an important objective of 
economic integration, but also contributes to the 
overall cohesion of the euro area.8 
There are no studies that show what degree of 
convergence would be necessary for the monetary 
union system and how much divergence it can with-
stand. In general, however, it is clear that divergent 
economic performance by states can undermine the 
stability of the economic area in two ways. First, the 
excessive public debt of individual economies poses 
an increased risk to the entire monetary union. In 
such cases, the ECB or the ESM can assist by alleviat-
ing the pressure of financial markets on the countries 
 
exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System 
for at least two years, and stable long-term interest rate 
levels. Exact figures can be found in Protocol 13 of 7 Decem-
ber 1992 on convergence criteria. 
6 See, e.g., Marco Buti and Andre Sapir, Economic Policy in 
EMU (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
7 Diaz del Hoyo et al., Real Convergence in the Eurozone 
(see note 1), 14ff. 
8 Jeffrey Franks, Bergljot Barkbu, Rodolphe Blavy, William 
Oman and Hanni Schoelermann, Economic Convergence in the 
Eurozone: Coming Together or Drifting Apart? IMF Working 
Paper, WP/18/10 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund [IMF], 2018), 7f. 
concerned. However, this requires a convergence of 
political interests at the euro level, as other countries 
must agree to bear the costs and risks of financial as-
sistance. Second, a lack of sufficient political integra-
tion and convergence of interests can pose a risk to 
the stability of the currency area. Different economic 
performances lead to different social situations; in 
turn, this results in differing political objectives for 
European integration.9 As a consequence, the social 
aspects of economic divergence have increasingly 
come to the fore since the beginning of the euro 
crisis. If the political objectives of the largest econo-
mies diverge significantly and become increasingly 
difficult to reconcile, this could lead to the disintegra-
tion of monetary union. 
The EU-19 format brings together economies of 
different sizes, following different economic models 
and at different stages of economic development. 
The common monetary policy and strict fiscal policy 
therefore complicate overall economic policy. Some 
countries in the currency area found it easier to cope 
with the consequences of the global financial crisis 
and the euro crisis, while others are still struggling 
with the economic, financial, political and social 
consequences. The wide range and scale of these 
problems are particularly evident in the case of the 
three largest euro area economies. 
The main challenge to the smooth functioning of 
monetary union is member state diversity. They differ 
in their traditions, institutions and patterns of eco-
nomic thought and action. The fact that their economic 
institutions, such as the labour market, are not equally 
efficient and flexible contributed directly to the dif-
ference in individual countries’ economic perfor-
mance during the crisis. Such particularities are diffi-
cult to bring together under a common umbrella of 
a single currency, uniform fiscal rules and uniform 
monetary policy. Another important factor is that 
while monetary policy is regulated centrally by the 
ECB, economic policy is still the responsibility of 
member states. There are certain fiscal rules to which 
all states must adhere, but it is still up to national 
institutions to shape economic policies. Differences in 
the quality of state and economic institutions as well 
as in economic and social models are therefore consti-
 
9 Peter Becker, “Die soziale Dimension fortentwickeln”, 
in Die Zukunft der Eurozone. Wie wir den Euro retten und Europa 
zusammenhalten, ed. Alexander Schellinger and Philip Stein-
berg, 173–188 (176) (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2016). 
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tutive for the differences in member states’ economic 
development. 
Fundamental Differences in 
Economic Models 
The economic models of EU countries differ in the 
way their product and labour markets function, in 
their welfare and education systems, politics, culture 
and even underlying ideology.10 Large economies, 
which are often complex, cannot always be assigned a 
universal classification. The three economic models 
are indeed classified differently. Germany and France 
are often referred to as belonging to the continental 
model, Italy to the Mediterranean model.11 Some-
times Germany and France are also categorised as 
“northwestern continental”.12 
Within the monetary union, there are further 
categories. One group consists of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Finland. They 
pursue an export-orientated growth model and are 
referred to as Coordinated Market Economies (CME). 
Such market economies prefer to coordinate their 
relations with other economic actors rather than rely 
on pure market forces. The southern European coun-
tries are Mediterranean Market Economies (MME): 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy.13 These countries 
have a limited institutional capacity to coordinate 
wages and implement long-term growth strategies. 
Before joining the Monetary Union, they used peri-
odic devaluations of their respective currencies as an 
instrument to increase their competitiveness.14 
In this typology, the French model is situated in 
between CME and MME, although it has more simi-
 
10 See, e.g., B. Steven Rosefielde, Comparative Economic 
Systems. Culture, Wealth, and Power in the 21st Century (Malden, 
Mass.: Blackwell, 2002); Bruno Amable, The Diversity of Modern 
Capitalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003); Beáta Farkas, Models of Capitalism in the European Union. 
Post-crisis Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
11 Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism (see note 10), 92. 
12 Farkas, Models of Capitalism in the European Union 
(see note 10), 146–70. 
13 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: 
The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: 
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003). 
14 Peter A. Hall, “Varieties of Capitalism in Light of the 
Euro Crisis”, Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 1 (2018): 
7–30 (11ff.). 
larities with the Southern European variant.15 Italy’s 
economic model also has some specific features, in 
particular the importance of correlations between 
central and regional institutions (regional capital-
ism).16 The economic models of the CME euro states 
are said to be more adaptable to changing external 
conditions because their growth strategies are “ex-
ternally” orientated, and because they have pro-
nounced cultures of internal cooperation. This is 
particularly important in the face of strong external 
shocks such as the global financial crisis. The type 
of economic model therefore plays a crucial role in 
a country’s economic development. With monetary 
integration, the Euro area member states lost a con-
stitutive component of their options for steering eco-
nomic policy. This particularly affected those econo-
mies whose competitive strategy was based on peri-
odically devaluing their own currency within the 
framework of an autonomous monetary policy. 
The overview of the three major economies in 
Table 1 (p. 10) shows their considerable differences: in 
territorial design, the role of the state and its relation-
ship to the economy, but also in economic philoso-
phy and the objectives of economic policy. The char-
acteristics of the Italian model are difficult to capture 
in some categories, but in most cases it can be located 
between the German and French systems. Moreover, 
the Italian South represents a different model than 
the North, where industrial production and services 
play a much more important role. 
The three countries also differ in the dominant 
schools of economic thought. Germany’s Ordoliberal-
ism and France’s neo-Keynesian orientation, in par-
ticular, are often in opposition. German and French 
economic thinking differs, among other things, 
in terms of the prevailing rules, the government’s 
freedom to borrow, the role of monetary policy and 
inflation, and freedom of trade and competition.17 
The most important factors in German economic 
thinking are personal responsibility, the disciplinary 
function of the financial markets, low inflation, 
stable finances and the independence of the central 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Carlo Trigilia and Luigi Burroni, “Italy: Rise, Decline 
and Restructuring of a Regionalized Capitalism”, Economy and 
Society 38, no. 4 (2009): 630–53. 
17 See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-
Pierre Landau, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas (Princeton 
University Press, 2016; Kindle edition), 1236–1496. 
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bank.18 Italian economic thinking, in turn, has been 
strongly influenced by both Germany and France. 
The Italian and French economies are similar in their 
demand-led, Keynes-inspired economic policies.19 
Such deviations in interests and theoretical approaches 
make it difficult for euro area members to agree on a 
common direction in economic policy. This increases 
the divergence of economic policies, which are mainly 
the responsibility of member states. 
 
18 Franz-Josef Meiers, Germany’s Role in the Euro Crisis. Berlin’s 
Quest for a More Perfect Monetary Union (Cham: Springer 2015), 
11–15. 
19 Bruno Amable, Elvire Guillaud and Stefano Palom-
barini, L’économie politique de néolibéralisme, le cas de la France 
et de I’Italie (Paris: Éditions Rue d’Ulm/Presses de l’École 
normale supérieure, 2012). 
The Role of the State and Social Dialogue 
An important feature in which the three major 
economies differ is the role of the state. The inequali-
ties in this area are relevant to both the emergence 
of divergences and the necessary adjustment mecha-
nisms. 
In France, the state plays an especially important 
role. Compared to Germany and Italy, the country 
has a very long tradition of state centralisation, which 
originated with King Louis XIV (1638–1715). The 
Italian experience with statehood, on the other hand, 
is less continuous. Until the foundation of the King-
dom in 1861, Italy was really only a geographical 
concept. Despite the country’s regional diversity, the 
unitary-state model was chosen to build a compact 
nation state. This marked the beginning of the con-
flict between the central government and the regions, 
Table 1 
The Economic Models of Germany, France and Italy 
 Germany France Italy 
Type of state federalism centralised unitary state regional unitary state 
Model of capitalism  “managed capitalism” state capitalism dysfunctional 
state capitalism,  
regionalised capitalism 
State/economy relations state as guarantor of free 
competition, state as 
regulator 
state as driver, govern-
ment control 
state oriented towards 
patronage and subsidies 
Dominant economic 
philosophy 
Ordoliberalism (Neo-)Keynesianism elements of both, domi-
nated by (Neo-)Keynes-
ianism 
Growth model export-based based on domestic 
demand 
mixed 
Orientation of economic 
policy 
supply policy demand policy demand policy 
Priorities of economic 
policy 
price stability, economic 
growth, employment, 
balance 
economic growth, 
employment 
economic growth, 
employment 
Author’s presentation based on: Sinah Schnells, Deutschland und Frankreich im Krisenmanagement der Eurozone. Kompromisse trotz unter-
schiedlicher Präferenzen? (Freie Universität Berlin, 2016), 45; Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau, The Euro 
and the Battle of Ideas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Vincent Della Sala, “The Italian Model of Capitalism: On the 
Road between Globalization and Europeanization?”, Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 6 (2004): 1041–57; Carlo Trigilia and 
Luigi Burroni, “Italy: Rise, Decline and Restructuring of a Regionalized Capitalism”, Economy and Society 38, no. 4 (2009): 630–53. 
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which manifests itself particularly strongly in south-
ern Italy. An important feature that distinguishes 
Italy from Germany and France is the North-South 
divide in economic development. 
The differences in the role of the state are evident, 
for example, in public expenditure as a share of GDP. 
A historically evolved feature of the French economic 
model is the high level of government spending in 
relation to general economic output. According to the 
OECD, in 2017 France’s government expenditure ratio 
was 56.4 percent of GDP and was the highest of all 
OECD countries. In Italy, this indicator is lower than 
for France, at 48.7 percent, but the strong interven-
tion of the state clearly distinguishes both from the 
German model, where the level of government spend-
ing relative to GDP is only 43.9 percent.20 France is 
an active shareholder of the largest companies. This 
is problematic in so far as the government shares 
responsibility for the companies’ financial situation, 
as well as their protection against foreign takeover.21 
As the example of the Nordic countries shows, a 
stronger role of the state in the economy and high tax 
burdens do not necessarily lead to lower economic 
performance. However, the Nordic economic models 
have specific characteristics such as efficient state 
institutions, a business-friendly environment, high 
competitiveness through innovation, low product 
market regulation, efficient social protection, a high 
degree of media freedom, low corruption, effective 
collective bargaining and high-quality education with 
broad access. In the absence of these characteristics, 
however, a high level of government spending has 
considerable negative consequences. First, the risk 
of misallocation of resources increases as the state 
intervenes in the allocation process and the latter 
is no longer guided by market mechanisms. Second, 
it multiplies the social groups that engage in “rent-
seeking”, leading to the politicisation of transfers. 
Where the state exercises a stronger redistributive 
role, there are, as a rule, large numbers of domestic 
actors who are not interested in the status quo 
changing. 
Political institutions should above all preserve the 
stability of a country and at the same time be able 
 
20 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), General Government Spending (indicator), 2018, 
doi: 10.1787/a31cbf4d-en (accessed 26 April 2018). 
21 Michael Stothard, “France: The Politics of State Owner-
ship”, Financial Times, 13 November 2016. 
to initiate reforms. In Italy, political instability – 
reflected in frequent changes of government – is a 
major obstacle to coherent economic policies. Con-
stant changes of government stand in the way of 
long-term strategies, such as those required to devel-
op southern Italy. Italy has a tradition of technocratic 
government (governo tecnico) to compensate for the in-
ability of political parties to form stable coalitions. 
Such governments usually take on the difficult task 
of implementing reforms that are unpopular in 
society.22 Although political cycles in France are 
much more stable than in Italy, internal party con-
flicts often block reforms. To surmount such situa-
tions, the Paris Government can use the legal instru-
ment of the decree or Article 49.3 of the French Con-
stitution. The latter allows the government to force 
a bill through parliament unless parliament votes a 
no confidence measure in the government. This pro-
cedure was used several times between 2015 and 
2017 to implement labour market reforms. The Ger-
man political system is currently in a state of flux 
because the country’s political scene is becoming 
increasingly fragmented; this makes it more difficult 
to form government coalitions. 
Another important factor is the ability of the most 
important actors in the economy, including trade 
unions, to influence economic policy. France has one 
of the lowest rates of union membership in the OECD 
(7.9 percent in 2015) and yet the highest percentage 
of workers covered by collective agreements (98.5 per-
cent in 2014). This means that French unions nego-
tiate not only for their own members, but for the 
sector as a whole, making them much more powerful 
than unions in Germany. There the proportion of 
trade union members is significantly higher than in 
France – in 2015 it stood at 17,6 percent – without 
this being reflected in greater influence. As can be 
observed in negotiations, French trade unions are 
more politicised than German ones. In Italy, the role 
of trade unions is yet more complex. At 35.7 percent 
(2015), the proportion of members is considerably 
higher again than in Germany. However, the influ-
ence of Italian trade unions varies from sector to 
 
22 Examples of such (short-lived) governments are the ones 
headed by Lamberto Dini (1995/96), Carlo Azeglio Ciampi 
(1993/94) or Mario Monti (2011–2013), see Elisa Cencig, 
Italy’s Economy in the Eurozone Crisis and Monti’s Reform Agenda, 
Working Paper FG 1, 2012/05 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, September 2012), 31. 
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sector and region to region. In addition, Italy has a 
large number of small enterprises with few workers 
and a high level of irregular employment. 
The Efficiency of Public Institutions 
There is a positive correlation between the economic 
institutions of a state and its economic performance. 
The quality of institutions is sometimes presented as 
decisive for the success or failure of entire nations.23 
More recent analyses have also shown that institu-
tions are an important factor in explaining the eco-
nomic divergence between members of the monetary 
union.24 There is evidence of a direct link between 
institutions and public debt on the one hand and eco-
nomic growth on the other.25 Moreover, the research 
in institutional economics demonstrates that the fun-
damental prerequisite for better economic policy is to 
reform the social and political institutions that shape it. 
The institutional perspective must therefore be 
taken into account in explaining the euro crisis. The 
“northern” economies of Europe, including Germany, 
had more institutional capacity than the “southern” 
ones to pursue export-orientated growth strategies. 
Such strategies require coordination between pro-
ducers, coordinated wage bargaining and cooperation 
in vocational training with a focus on skills and inno-
vation promotion.26 
The efficiency of state institutions and state regula-
tion has a direct impact on a country’s economic ac-
 
23 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations 
Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (London, 2012). 
Douglass North, among others, has analysed the role of insti-
tutions in the economy. He emphasises the importance 
of obstacles, such as ideologies and cultural norms, to the 
formation of efficient institutions, Douglass C. North, Insti-
tutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Political 
Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge, 1990), 3–10. 
24 “Real Convergence in the Euro Area: Evidence, Theory 
and Policy Implications”, ECB Economic Bulletin, no. 5 (2015): 
30–45; Elias Papaioannou, “EZ Original Sin? Nominal 
Rather than Institutional Convergence”, VOX CEPR’s Policy 
Portal, 7 September 2015, https://voxeu.org/article/nominal-
rather-institutional-convergence-ez (accessed 3 July 2018). 
25 Klaus Masuch, Edmund Moshammer and Beatrice Pier-
luigi, Institutions, Public Debt and Growth in Europe, ECB Work-
ing Paper Series, no. 1963 (Frankfurt, September 2016). 
26 Hall, “Varieties of Capitalism in Light of the Euro Crisis” 
(see note 14). 
tivity. It is a prerequisite for innovation and produc-
tivity. The World Bank’s “Doing Business” analyses 
show this correlation.27 They identify legal obstacles 
in Italy, for example, which are reflected in a low 
recovery rate and high insolvency costs. In addition, 
these hurdles have a negative impact on current 
efforts to restructure the country’s banking sector, 
which is suffering from non-performing loans. Re-
gional data, on the other hand, show that there are 
significant differences in the efficiency of public insti-
tutions between the north and the south of Italy.28 
Economic Structures: 
Differences and Connections 
One of the main characteristics of the euro area is a 
high level of economic-structures differentiation at 
the national level: some are demand-led, others sup-
ply-led.29 At present, the three largest economies in 
the euro area show marked differences.30 
An open economy has some advantages for a coun-
try’s competitiveness and convergence towards more 
efficient economies. It expands the markets for do-
mestic companies and exposes them to international 
competition. An economy’s success in international 
competition depends directly on the quality of gov-
ernment institutions and regulatory practices, on 
productivity, infrastructure and human capital.31 The 
 
27 The World Bank, Doing Business 2018. Reforming to Create 
Jobs (Washington, D.C., 2018), http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
(accessed 7 June 2018). 
28 See, e.g., Annamaria Nifo and Gaetano Vecchione, 
“Measuring Institutional Quality in Italy”, Rivista economica 
del Mezzogiorno 1/2 (2015): 157–82. 
29 Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan, “European Monetary 
Integration and the Incompatibility of National Varieties of 
Capitalism”, Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 2 (2016): 
318–36. 
30 In Germany, industry has a high share of GDP (30.1 per-
cent) and agriculture a low share (0.6 percent). In France, on 
the other hand, industry accounts for only 19.4 percent of 
GDP and agriculture for 1.6 percent. In Italy, these figures 
are 24 percent and 2.1 percent respectively. See Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA), World Factbook. GDP – Composition, by 
Sector of Origin, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2012.html (accessed 3 July 2018). 
31 World Economic Forum, The Case for Trade and Competi-
tiveness. Global Agenda Councils on Competitiveness and Trade and 
FDI (Geneva, September 2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/ 
WEF_GAC_Competitiveness_2105.pdf (accessed 3 July 2018). 
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German economy has a higher degree of openness 
than the Italian or French economies. It is strongly 
geared to exports, which accounted for 46 percent of 
German GDP in 2016.32 That year, Germany generated 
the largest trade surplus worldwide. There are now 
also many competitive companies in Italy that are 
successfully expanding in foreign markets. However, 
the level of Italian exports to GDP is significantly 
lower (30 percent). 
The economies of the three countries being exam-
ined here are closely connected. There are more inter-
dependencies between the French and German econo-
mies than between each of the two and the Italian 
economy. How mutual economic relations have de-
veloped also has to do with the extent to which the 
three countries cooperated politically after the Second 
World War. France and Germany worked closely 
together, which led to a strong economic exchange 
and mutual dependencies between the two econo-
mies. For both France and Italy, the German economy 
carries enormous weight,33 achieving a significant 
surplus in bilateral trade.34 All three countries are 
also important sources and targets of reciprocal direct 
investment. Although their financial sectors are domi-
nated by domestic institutions, they are still strongly 
interconnected.35 In December 2017, German banks 
held financial claims against France amounting to ap-
proximately €180 billion and the liabilities of Italian 
banks to German ones totalled €67 billion.36 This is 
an important link between the three economies; it 
is also a potential channel of risk transmission. 
 
32 OECD, Trade in Goods and Services [database], 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/0fe445d9-en (accessed 4 April 2019). 
33 The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), France 
[database], http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/fra/ 
(accessed 16 December 2017). 
34 With France about €35 billion, with Italy about €9.5 
billion. Federal Statistical Office, Foreign Trade. Ranking of 
Germany’s Trading Partners in Foreign Trade 2017 (Wiesbaden, 
24 October 2018). 
35 ECB, Report on Financial Structures (Frankfurt, October 
2017), 15. 
36 Deutsche Bundesbank, Balance of Payments Statistics 
January 2018, Statistical Supplement 3 to the Monthly 
Report, 62, 
https://www.bundesbank.de/en/publications/statistics/statistic
al-supplements/balance-of-payments-statistics---january-2018-
708854 (accessed 8 February 2019). 
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The respective economic models and the efficiency 
of the national economic institutions have a direct 
influence on the economic performance of the three 
largest euro states. At the start of monetary union, 
the economic and political situation in Europe was 
quite different from what it is today. Following the 
implementation of Stage Three of Economic and 
Monetary Union in 1999, Italy and France experi-
enced stronger GDP growth dynamics than Germany. 
The Federal Republic was regarded as the “sick man 
of the euro”, and there were fears that its economic 
problems might have a negative impact on the sta-
bility of the single currency. 
Until 2005, economic cycles in Germany, France 
and Italy were relatively similar; thereafter growth 
slowed significantly in Italy. In the years of the global 
financial crisis starting in 2007 and during the euro 
area crisis, all three economies experienced a deep 
recession. That the decline in France was compara-
tively weaker is due to distinct features of the French 
economic model and the lower importance of foreign 
trade for the country. The Italian economy, on the 
other hand, was severely affected by the crisis, which 
was exacerbated by its subsequent budget consolida-
tion. That Italy’s GDP has risen noticeably since 2015 
is mainly due to the growth of the global economy 
and the ECB’s accommodative monetary policy. 
The next part of this study will examine the varied 
economic performance of the three countries with a 
special focus on the functioning of economic institu-
tions. Nominal convergence will be mainly analysed 
in the context of competitiveness and public finances. 
The aim is to clarify why the three economies have 
developed so differently. Real convergence will be 
measured on the basis of income development and 
the labour market situation. 
Competitiveness 
The Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) is one of 
the most important indicators of the competitiveness 
of an economy. It provides information on the price 
trends of goods produced in that country in relation 
to its main trading partners.37 The loss of competitive-
ness vis-à-vis trading partners caused by inflation 
differentials is generally considered one of the main 
reasons for the weak economic performance of cer-
tain euro area countries. Higher inflation in one of 
the member states can make exports from that coun-
try more expensive than exports from the others, 
while imported products simultaneously become 
cheaper than domestic products. This mechanism 
is known as the appreciation of the real effective ex-
change rate. If, on the other hand, the development 
of the REER is negative, the domestic economy will 
become more competitive compared to that of its 
trading partners. 
Graph 1 (p. 15) shows how the REER developed 
between 1999 and 2016 in the three major euro area 
countries and in the euro area as a whole. It is evi-
dent that Italy’s membership of the monetary union 
has had a negative impact on its exports because the 
high REER has reduced the external competitiveness 
of its economy. Even though the price competitive-
ness of France and Italy improved after 2010, Germa-
ny’s real effective exchange rate remains well below 
that of the other two countries. The German economy 
has remained much more competitive because it has 
been able to keep its labour costs low. Graph 2 shows 
 
37 The real effective exchange rate refers to the nominal 
effective exchange rate, which is usually deflated by relative 
price or cost ratios. However, the REER does not cover factors 
related to non-price competitiveness, such as product quality 
or the reputation of a manufacturer. The REER indicator 
measures both nominal and real convergence. 
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the development of this factor in Germany, France 
and Italy from 1999 to 2017. Clearly the trend differs 
between the three countries. After 2001, labour costs 
developed very differently in France and Italy com-
pared to Germany. The euro crisis did not bring about 
any significant convergence; although labour costs 
have now also fallen in France and Italy, the same 
trend has applied to Germany. The most important 
explanation for Germany’s differing values is the 
way the German labour market institutions function. 
Its labour market is based on flexible contracts and 
reciprocal agreements between trade unions and 
employers’ organisations. These instruments have 
made it possible to decentralise wage bargaining and 
shift it to the enterprise and industry level.38 
As a “northern” economy with strong institutions, 
Germany thus enjoys a considerable competitive ad-
vantage, which leads to the accumulation of current 
 
38 Matteo Bugamelli, Silvia Fabiani, Stefano Federico, 
Alberto Felettigh, Claire Giordano and Andrea Linarello, Back 
on Track? A Macro-micro Narrative of Italian Exports, Matteri di 
Economia e Finanza, no. 399 (Rome: Banca d’Italia, October 
2017), 35ff. 
account surpluses. This is mainly due to wage 
restraint, but also to other factors that ensure an 
optimal product range for imports from the BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa) or ensure cost efficiency by using supply 
chains towards economies with low labour costs. The 
dynamics of relative prices reflect not only changes 
in labour costs and other production factors, but also 
growth in productivity and quality improvements. 
Qualitative improvements were similar in the three 
large euro states. Low productivity, however, was a 
significant challenge of the Italian economy. 
The current account balances of France, Germany 
and Italy have also increasingly diverged since the be-
ginning of the monetary union. The current account 
balance reveals the specific features of the French 
economy. It is mainly based on domestic consump-
tion, is strongly driven by government expenditure 
and its external competitiveness is low. The core of 
the current account is the trade balance. One of the 
most controversial topics in debates on imbalances 
in the euro area is Germany’s massive trade surplus. 
Although most of this is achieved with countries out-
Graph 1 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) of Germany, France and Italy, 1999–2016 
 
Source: UNCTAD. 
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side the monetary union,39 in 2017 Germany also 
generated significant surpluses in trade with France 
(€41.4 billion) and Italy (€10 billion).40 In France, it 
is often argued that the German surplus is at the ex-
pense of the other euro countries.41 Germany’s trade 
balance surplus is interpreted in different ways, but 
in any case results from several internal and external 
factors. One explanation lies in the basic determinants 
of import and export, such as the productivity of the 
German economy and the quality of its products. An-
other interpretation is that in the event of a surplus 
of national savings over national investments – as in 
Germany – the savings flow abroad as capital exports 
and promote the import of German products there.42 
 
39 Federal Statistical Office, Foreign Trade (see note 34). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Elisabeth Behrmann, “France’s Macron Says German 
Trade Surplus Harmful to EU Economy”, Bloomberg, 17 April 
2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-16/ 
france-s-macron-says-german-trade-surplus-harmful-to-eu-
economy (accessed 4 July 2018). 
42 Jan Priewe, Understanding Germany’s Current Account Sur-
plus, Paper Presented to the FMM Annual Conference (Berlin, 
2017); Robert Kollmann, Marco Ratto, Werner Roeger, Jan  
 
According to yet another interpretation, Germany’s 
low REER and low domestic demand are responsible 
for the surplus. The latter, it is argued, poses a threat 
to the euro area, as other countries will not be able to 
keep up due to the German price advantage. 
There is also a risk for Germany itself. As men-
tioned above, Germany exports a great deal of capital, 
making it an important creditor state. Moreover, an 
export-driven current account balance containing 
massive surpluses should be considered as a warning 
signal because it often reflects economic problems. 
These may be structural weaknesses requiring changes 
in economic and social policies, such as low domestic 
demand, demographic ageing, high labour taxation, 
insufficient investment or low wages. In general, the 
 
in ’t Veld and Lukas Vogel, What Drives the German Current 
Account? And How Does It Affect Other EU Member States? Economic 
Papers 516 (Brussels: European Commission, April 2014); 
Mathilde le Moigne and Xavier Ragot, “France et Allemagne: 
une histoire du désajustement européen”, Revue de l’OFCE, 
142 (2015/16): 177–231; Philip Steinberg, “Global Imbal-
ances – Coordinating with Different Script Books”, in Ordo-
liberalism: A German Oddity? ed. Thorsten Beck and Hans-Hel-
mut Kotz, 167–180 (168) (London: VoxEU, CEPR Press, 2017). 
Graph 2 
Relative labour costs in Germany, France and Italy, 1999–2017 (1999 = 100%) 
 
Source: OECD. 
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German trade surplus is due to both structural and 
economic policy factors – and it should be tackled. 
Possible solutions on the German side include streng-
thening domestic demand through wage increases 
and a more expansionary fiscal policy.43 However, 
these methods would not necessarily increase internal 
consumption or imports from other euro area coun-
tries, including France or Italy. Higher wages can also 
lead to higher savings. To achieve more convergence, 
structural adjustments in the other euro area coun-
tries will also have to be pursued. 
Public Finances 
One of the most important factors exposing the 
divergence between the large euro area countries 
 
43 Heribert Dieter, Stubbornly Germany First: Options for Reduc-
ing the World’s Largest Current Account Surplus, SWP Comment 
48/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Novem-
ber 2018); Jan Prieve, A Time Bomb for the Euro? Understanding 
Germany’s Current Account Surplus, IMK Studies no. 59 (Düssel-
dorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 2018), 28. 
is the state of public finances. There is a close link 
between the problems of persistent negative current 
account balances discussed above and excessive 
public sector debt. The latter leads to a negative net 
foreign asset position and increases a country’s de-
pendence on foreign capital to finance its domestic 
economy. The budget deficit and the ratio of sover-
eign debt to GDP are among the most important 
criteria for nominal convergence when a country 
wants to join the euro area. 
As Graph 3 shows, France, Germany and Italy 
recorded similar debt financing costs almost through-
out the entire first decade of monetary union. This 
came to an end with the outbreak of the global finan-
cial crisis and the Euro area crisis. The German and 
French yield curves on one side and the Italian on the 
other side started to diverge significantly. German 
and French government bonds were also priced differ-
ently by the investors. The interest rates of the Ger-
man government bonds served as a benchmark to 
assess the trends in financing costs of the other EU-19 
countries. 
Italian public finances are a special case. After the 
onset of the global financial crisis, the country was 
particularly hard hit by the increase of interest rates 
Graph 3 
Evolution of yields on ten-year government bonds in Germany, France and Italy 
 
Source: OECD. 
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of its government bonds. Its present level of public 
debt is alarmingly high. However, the problem of 
growing public debt predates the crisis in the mon-
etary union. In Italy, government debt began to rise 
gradually as early as the mid-1960s. This was justified 
by the fight against inflation and the attempt to stabi-
lise the lira within the framework of the European 
Monetary System. However, the origins of Italy’s debt 
problem are much more complex. They can also be 
explained by the economic differences between the 
north and south of the country and by the behaviour 
of its national institutions. In southern Italy, large 
and persistent deficits arose, which were not counter-
acted for political reasons. Regional governments 
there caused massive overspending without internal-
ising the costs of growing national debt.44 Neither the 
centre-right nor the centre-left governments in Rome 
 
44 Luciano Mauro, Cesare Buiatti and Gaetano Carmeci, 
The Origins of the Sovereign Debt of Italy: A Common Pool Issue?, 
CRENoS Working Paper 12/2012 (Cagliari and Sassari: Centro 
Ricerche Economiche Nord Sud [CRENoS], May 2012), http:// 
crenos.unica.it/crenos/sites/default/files/WP12-12.pdf (ac-
cessed 4 July 2018). 
during the 2000s were able to push through the re-
forms needed to reduce debt and improve the coun-
try’s competitiveness and cohesion. Since the escala-
tion of the euro area crisis in 2010, the problem has 
become even more acute. In the summer of 2011, 
Italy was on the verge of insolvency. The reason was 
not only the high public debt, but also the distrust of 
international investors, which was fuelled by a con-
flict between then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 
and Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti. The Securities 
Markets Programme, a bond purchasing programme 
of the European Central Bank for the secondary mar-
ket, probably saved the country from insolvency. The 
ECB is currently the only institution able to stabilise 
the country’s debt market. In mid-2018, the announce-
ment of additional public spending by the Conte gov-
ernment led to a substantial rise in interest rates on 
Italian government bonds, raising questions about the 
sustainability of the country’s public finances. In 
2018 the public debt was close to 133 percent of GDP 
and the Italian debt market was far from stable. 
France also has significant problems in stabilising 
its public finances, but the difficulties are somewhat 
different. The high level of government spending – 
with France topping all other OECD countries – re-
Graph 4 
Public debt of Germany, France and Italy, 1960–2018 
 
Source: OECD. 
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mains at the heart of national budget problems. Ac-
cording to the IMF, what caused the country’s large 
budget deficits were the rapid growth in social, wage 
and municipal spending during the global financial 
crisis.45 France also has the highest private sector debt 
within the euro area (households and non-financial 
corporations). Private debt accounts for almost 130 
percent of GDP, and is rising. Potentially, this is a sig-
nificant risk transmission channel for the country’s 
entire economy as well as its public finances.46 
In Germany, the trend in public finances is com-
pletely different from France and Italy. During the 
euro crisis, the country benefited from significantly 
lower borrowing costs. This factor has helped to bal-
ance the federal budget since 2014. The level of gov-
ernment gross debt fell from 81 percent of GDP in 
2010 to 60.9 percent in 2018. According to some cal-
culations, the total savings that Germany achieved 
between 2010 and 2015 through the low interest rates 
on government bonds add up to almost €100 billion.47 
Another problem with public finances is that they 
are linked to the banking sector. There is a link 
between taxpayers and banks for as long as the banks 
are restructured and capitalised with public money. 
Contrary to media coverage, state aids to the banking 
sector in Germany during the crisis years were much 
greater than in France or Italy. During the period 
2010–2017, government debt resulting from support 
to financial institutions was between 5 and 10 per-
cent of GDP, while Italy and France had almost no 
such debt at all.48 Due to the increasing spreads on 
government bonds, the governments of the southern 
euro countries were unable to provide any significant 
assistance to the banking sector. Germany, on the 
other hand, was able to help its banks thanks to low 
 
45 IMF, France, IMF Country Report no. 17/288 (Washing-
ton, D.C., September 2017), 6. 
46 Banque de France, Non-financial Sector Debt Ratios – Inter-
national Comparisons. Second Quarter 2017 (14 November 2017). 
47 Germany’s Benefit from the Greek Crisis, ed. Leibniz-Institut 
für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH), IWH Online 7/2015 
(Halle [Saale], 2015), http://www.iwh-halle.de/fileadmin/user_ 
upload/publications/iwh_online/io_2015-07.pdf (accessed 
4 July 2018). 
48 European Commission, Eurostat Supplementary Table for 
Reporting Government Interventions to Support Financial Institu-
tions, Background Note (April 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/ 
eurostat/documents/1015035/8441002/Background-note-on-
gov-interventions-Apr-2018.pdf/54c5e531-688b-427b-80a1-
46e471f3a54b (accessed 22 November 2018). 
spreads on government bonds, which ensured low 
financing costs for industry and helped finance for-
eign demand.49 In Italy, the sustainability of public 
finances is further undermined by the difficult situa-
tion within the banking sector. The third largest 
economy in the euro area has still a very high pro-
portion of non-performing loans (NPLs). In the second 
quarter of 2018, NPLs in Italy accounted for 9.9 per-
cent of total loans. In Germany, on the other hand, 
this share is only 1.5 percent, and in France 3.1 per-
cent.50 Non-performing loans are loans whose repay-
ment is either heavily in arrears or very unlikely. In 
such cases, the bank must make a value adjustment 
to the loan with additional capital, thereby either 
reducing its profit or increasing its loss. A high num-
ber of non-performing loans can therefore cause 
considerable difficulties for banks. 
Excessive public debt is a major burden on Italy’s 
budget. In times of unfavourable economic condi-
tions, there is no room for manoeuvre in fiscal policy 
to stimulate the economy. The cost of servicing the 
debt also increases the pressure on other expenditures 
in the budget. According to OECD figures, debt service 
costs in Italy amounted to 4.8 percent of nominal 
GDP in 2014.51 They thus exceeded the country’s 
public spending on education, which, according to 
UNESCO, amounted to only 4.1 percent of GDP in 
the same year.52 
The fiscal policy framework of the monetary union 
is a central theme for Paris, Rome and Berlin. Because 
the three countries differ in their economic perfor-
mance, they also pursue different political priorities 
with regard to the EU. The European Commission is 
calling for budget deficits to be reduced at a predeter-
mined pace. This prompts France and Italy to focus 
their efforts on making financial supervision in the 
euro area more flexible. For example, Paris has pro-
 
49 Marcello Minenna, The Incomplete Currency. The Future of 
the Euro and Solutions for the Eurozone (Chichester: Wiley, 2016), 
302f. 
50 IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) [database], http:// 
data.imf.org/?sk=51B096FA-2CD2-40C2-8D09-0699CC1764DA 
(accessed 26 November 2018). 
51 OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2018, Issue 1: Prelimi-
nary version (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018, Statistical An-
nex, table 35, p. 45, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_outlook-
v2018-1-en (accessed 30 November 2018). 
52 UNESCO, “Expenditure on education as % of GDP (from 
government sources)”, http://data.uis.unesco.org/index.aspx? 
queryid=181 (accessed 22 November 2018). 
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posed excluding investment or defence expenditure 
from the deficit calculation, which would loosen the 
EU framework. 
Of the three countries, Germany has the largest 
fiscal room for manoeuvre, but its fiscal policy re-
mains extremely rigid as it aims at balanced budgets. 
Opportunities to secure sustainable economic growth 
in Germany are therefore not being properly utilised. 
Its growth potential could be increased through in-
vestment in infrastructure, digital networks, better 
childcare, and increased integration of refugees and 
lower taxation of labour.53 On the other hand, the 
high indebtedness of some countries severely exacer-
bates the divergence problem in the euro area. Exces-
sive public debt slows down the economy in several 
ways, for example by crowding out private and public 
investment, or triggering speculation about a coun-
try’s possible insolvency. All this leads to macroeco-
nomic uncertainty, which is particularly strong in 
Italy. 
Income Development 
Real convergence, measured by per capita income, 
reflects how the population’s prosperity develops and 
is therefore closely linked to changes in social con-
ditions. Analyses of the situation prior to the creation 
of Economic and Monetary Union show that real con-
vergence between the current euro area countries 
has gradually declined since the early 1980s.54 It was 
expected that monetary union would strengthen 
convergence between members. This has not been 
achieved, however. In fact, there has been a strong 
process of divergence between the first members of 
the euro area since the introduction of the single cur-
rency. As the data show, the three major economies 
have developed differently in this respect. Graph 5 
(p. 21) shows that Italy’s GDP level per capita in 2018 
was on a similar level as in1999. The country’s per-
formance is worse than that of Greece and other euro 
area members who received financial assistance 
 
53 IMF, Germany, IMF Country Report no. 17/192 (Washing-
ton, D.C., July 2017), 10f. 
54 Bergljot Barkbu, Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody, 
“The Euro’s Twin Challenges: Experience and Lessons”, in 
The Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis, ed. 
James A. Caporaso and Martin Rhodes, 48–78 (57–62) 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
during the crisis. In 2019, Italy is expected to reach 
a symbolic GDP growth rate of around 0.2 percent. 
This will complicate the process of returning GDP per 
capita to the pre-crisis levels of 2007. According to 
IMF forecasts, this should be achieved by 2027. Fur-
thermore, there are also large differences in per 
capita income in Italy along the north-south axis. 
France has had a much better growth momentum 
since 1999. However, it must be remembered that the 
French population has grown faster than other coun-
tries’, so that its GDP per capita is proportionally 
lower. France has not been able to translate the addi-
tional labour supply into growth. Real GDP per capita 
has risen less in France than in some euro area coun-
tries that have experienced economic difficulties, 
such as Finland and Spain. 
The Labour Market Situation 
The economic performance and GDP per capita of 
individual countries often depend heavily on the 
quality of their public institutions.55 This is particu-
larly evident in Italy: the inefficiency of its public 
sector has a negative impact on the country’s com-
petitiveness. One of the most important areas of 
divergence between the three economies is the labour 
market, especially its flexibility. There are major prob-
lems in the way the Italian labour market institutions 
function. Italy ranks 116th on the Global Competitive-
ness Index in terms of labour market efficiency.56 This 
measures the ease with which workers are hired and 
dismissed, and collective bargaining takes place. Ger-
many and France ranked significantly higher: 14th 
and 56th, respectively. There is general agreement that 
countries whose labour and product markets have 
more rigid structures have been more affected by the 
crisis than those with more flexible markets. Existing 
divergences were thus encouraged.57 
Both France and Italy face the problem of structur-
al unemployment. The situation in both countries has 
deteriorated as a result of the euro crisis. From 2011 
 
55 Diaz del Hoyo et al., Real Convergence in the Eurozone (see 
note 1). 
56 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report, 
2017–2018 Edition (Geneva, September 2017), 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-
report-2017-2018 (accessed 4 July 2018). 
57 ECB, “Real Convergence in the Eurozone” (see note 24), 34. 
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to 2014, unemployment in Italy rose from around 8 
percent to over 12 percent. As of 2015, the situation 
gradually began to improve again, due to a change in 
economic conditions and some reforms of the Italian 
labour market (Jobs Act). However, the labour market 
is still a cause for concern. This is particularly true 
with respect to certain statistical values. For instance, 
the female employment rate in Italy is the third lowest 
of all OECD countries (ahead of Turkey and Mexico).58 
It is also striking that the costs of the crisis on the 
labour market are disproportionately borne by the 
younger population.59 Youth unemployment level in 
Italy is at almost 33 percent, one of the highest rates 
in Europe. In most cases, younger workers only have 
temporary contracts. However, the division of the 
labour market into temporary and permanent jobs is 
also a problem for the other large euro area countries. 
In 2017, almost 17 percent of employees in France 
were employed in temporary work – significantly 
 
58 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2017 (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2017), 19. 
59 IMF, Italy 2017 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff 
Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Italy, IMF 
Country Report no. 17/237 (Washington, D.C., July 2017). 
more than in Italy (15.4 percent) and Germany (12.8 
percent). In all three countries the share is thus above 
the OECD average of 11.2 percent.60 Among OECD 
members, France has not only the lowest rate of 
change from temporary to permanent contracts, but 
also the highest rate of under- and over-qualified 
workers in the workforce.61 This indicates institution-
al problems in the labour market linked to deficits in 
the education system and in vocational qualifications. 
In Italy, the north-south divide must be taken into 
account for the labour market as well. In 2018, un-
employment in Sicily was 21.5 percent, more than 
three times as high as in Lombardy (6 percent).62 For 
Italy as a whole, in 2017 the proportion of 15–29 
year olds who were Not in Education, Employment, 
or Training (NEET) was 25.11 percent.63 This is not 
 
60 OECD (2019), Temporary Employment (indicator), doi: 
10.1787/75589b8a-en (accessed 16 April 2019). 
61 Ibid. 
62 ISTAT, Unemployment Rate – Regional Level, http://dati. 
istat.it/Index.aspx?QueryId=20744&lang=en (accessed 
17 April 20190. 
63 OECD (2018), Youth Not in Employment, Education or 
Training (NEET) (indicator), doi: 10.1787/72d1033a-en (accessed 
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only the highest rate within the monetary union, but 
also one of the highest among OECD economies. In 
Italy, youth unemployment closely correlates with 
the rate of early school leavers, which is particularly 
high in the south. The euro crisis has made young 
people’s lack of prospects even worse; some scholars 
consider it a “lost generation”.64 
In Germany differences persist between east and 
west, which are reflected in unemployment statistics, 
real GDP per capita and the location of the largest 
companies. But neither Germany nor France has such 
serious regional differences as Italy. In France, the 
most vulnerable groups on the labour market are 
young low-skilled workers and immigrants from out-
side the EU.65 The situation in Germany is quite dif-
ferent from that of France and Italy. In the initial 
 
64 Ulrich Glassmann, “Eine verlorene Generation? Ursa-
chen der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in Italien”, in Italien zwischen 
Krise und Aufbruch. Reformen und Reformversuche der Regierung 
Renzi, ed. Alexander Grasse, Markus Grimm and Jan Labitzke, 
343–61 (Wiesbaden: Springer 2018). 
65 IMF, France, September 2017 (see note 45), 7th ed. 
phase of monetary union, Germany had to contend 
with even greater problems on the labour market 
than the other two countries. From 2004 to 2007, 
unemployment was higher in the largest EU economy 
than in Italy or France (see Graph 6). Not until 2009 
did Germany’s rate fall below Italy’s (7.7 percent), to 
7.6 percent.66 The labour-market and social reforms 
implemented by Germany between 2003 and 2005 
are one of the main reasons for its rising labour 
force participation and falling unemployment.67 Un-
employment has remained at its lowest level since 
reunification. In the coming years, however, Germany 
will face several challenges, such as integration of 
immigrants into the labour market. 
In summary, comparing the three largest euro 
economies reveals a growing divergence in competi-
tiveness, public finances and their social conditions. 
These differences in economic performance have 
 
66 Eurostat, Unemployment by Sex and Age, (last update; 
2 July 2018), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show. 
do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en (accessed 3 July 2018). 
67 IMF, Germany, July 2017 (see note 53). 
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various causes. Some can be attributed to monetary 
integration, which has eliminated the instrument of 
flexible exchange rates at the national level. However, 
the main reasons lie in the structural characteristics 
of the three economies. Persistent differences in 
inflation and labour market performance have con-
tributed to the existing chasm in competitiveness, 
which is reflected in the respective current account 
balances. A closer look reveals complex structural 
problems in labour markets and wide regional dispar-
ities, particularly in Italy. In theory, internal deflation 
is necessary to improve the country’s competitive-
ness. However, deflation would hamper growth. It 
is difficult to imagine that such a process would be 
socially and politically acceptable for Italy. Despite all 
this, the extent of economic divergence between the 
three economies is so significant that a sustainable 
convergence path for the monetary union cannot be 
achieved in the foreseeable future. 
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The need for convergence continues to play an im-
portant role in discussions at various levels on the 
future of monetary union. The ECB’s expansive mon-
etary policy largely contributed to the last phase 
of positive economic climate. In October 2018, net 
purchases of government bonds were reduced to €15 
billion per month and discontinued at the end of the 
year. If the expected slowdown in economic growth 
occurs, France, Germany and Italy could again drift 
further apart in their economic performance. The 
structural differences between the economic models 
of the three countries are unlikely to narrow signifi-
cantly in the foreseeable future. Therefore, economic 
divergence is likely to persist for a long time and 
remain one of the major challenges for European 
economic integration.68 
Two questions are particularly important in this 
context. First, might withdrawing from the monetary 
union or splitting it into two currency areas be a 
better alternative to retaining the current composi-
tion of the euro area? Would convergence between 
Europe’s largest economies be strengthened if 
national currencies were reintroduced? Second, in 
which direction should the entire economic and 
monetary integration process move? In the medium 
term, monetary union is not expected to transform 
into a federal or quasi-federal system. What path 
should be taken to better prepare a euro area with 
limited convergence for the next crisis, taking into 
account the different interests of the three largest 
countries? 
 
68 Farkas, Models of Capitalism in the European Union 
(see note 10), 498–505. 
Convergence through Disintegration or 
Fragmentation of the Monetary Union? 
Withdrawal from Monetary Union 
Since the outbreak of the euro area crisis, there have 
been regular discussions as to whether a return to the 
national currency in some states could help improve 
their economic situation and increase convergence.69 
Of the three countries discussed here, speculation 
about Italy’s withdrawal from the euro is particularly 
frequent.70 There are several factors that could speak 
in favour of such a step. A national currency with a 
flexible exchange rate can help to mitigate external 
shocks and increase the price competitiveness of a 
state’s economy. In addition, national monetary poli-
cy can be better coordinated with national fiscal 
policy, allowing a country to respond to macroeco-
nomic imbalances with a consistent policy mix. 
However, there are many arguments that contra-
dict the assumption that the reintroduction of national 
currencies would improve convergence between 
countries. Three overriding aspects speak against an 
optimistic interpretation of a euro withdrawal: the 
behaviour of the population, the likely depreciation 
of the new currency, and the lack of a regulated 
withdrawal procedure. 
First, while a return to the national currency 
would restore national control over monetary policy, 
the first reports of the country in question leaving the 
euro should be expected to lead to a “bank run”, i.e. 
inhabitants would try en masse to withdraw their 
 
69 See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, “The Problem with Europe Is 
the Euro”, The Guardian, 10 August 2016. 
70 See, e.g., “Hans-Werner Sinn rechnet mit Euro-Austritt 
Italiens”, Die Welt, 17 October 2016; Silvia Ognibene, “Italy’s 
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Reuters, 7 February 2018. 
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deposits as quickly as possible. This would paralyse 
the financial sector. Such a scenario is particularly 
likely in Italy, where there is little confidence in the 
banking system. To prevent a run on the banks, capi-
tal controls would have to be introduced to prevent 
capital from flowing abroad. This in turn would pre-
vent the country from fully participating in the EU 
internal market, which would be extremely damaging 
to the economy and fatal to many businesses. 
The depreciation of a new currency 
would mean bankruptcy for many 
private companies in Italy. 
The second set of counterarguments is related to 
the depreciation of the new currency. Such deprecia-
tion would be initiated almost automatically if inves-
tors lacked confidence in the new currency. On the 
one hand, the depreciation would mean bankruptcy 
for a large number of private companies in the coun-
try, because the companies’ assets would be converted 
into the new currency, whereas liabilities to foreign 
companies would still have to be paid in euros. On 
the other hand, investors who have invested in public 
debt would be severely damaged by the withdrawal of 
the country from the euro. A special feature of Italy’s 
public debt is that only a relatively small proportion 
of public debt is held by non-residents: 33.3 percent 
in August 2018.71 Italy thus has the lowest share of 
government bonds held by non-residents among all 
euro countries.72 Domestic investors would be paid 
back their debts in the new currency, which would 
have a much lower value against the euro. Even more 
serious would be state insolvency, in which case the 
debts would not be repaid at all. The country would 
therefore be confronted with serious financial prob-
lems as a result of its withdrawal from the euro. An-
other argument in the context of currency devalua-
tion is the related price increase for imported goods. 
This would increase inflation, and government bond 
yields would rise. Debt repayment in euros would 
 
71 49 percent in March 2008. See “Quanto debito pubblico 
è detenuto all’estero? Il termometro della fiducia?” Il Sole 
24 Ore (online), 2 November 2018, https://www.infodata. 
ilsole24ore.com/2018/11/02/quanto-debito-pubblico-detenuto-
allestero-termometro-della-fiducia/?refresh_ce=1 (accessed 
22 November 2018). 
72 In Germany and France, the share is around 60 percent. 
Bruegel, Bruegel Database of Sovereign Bond Holdings (see note 71). 
therefore be a major problem for the budget of the 
country concerned. For example, the French central 
bank estimates additional debt servicing costs of €30 
billion if a new French currency depreciated.73 
An unresolved issue is how the depreciation of the 
new currency would affect exchange rates. In the case 
of France, the new national currency would lose its 
value only against a few countries, including Germa-
ny, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, follow-
ing a withdrawal from the euro. Because these coun-
tries account for only about 45 percent of France’s 
exports, more than half of its exports would be less 
competitive than before.74 Additionally, countries 
such as Italy could go into severe recession or even 
insolvency after leaving the currency area or after 
its disintegration. This, in turn, would have a very 
negative effect on exports, such as France’s, due to 
reduced demand. An additional factor is the political 
will of the government. Currency depreciation might 
well appear to be a more attractive measure for in-
creasing the competitiveness of a country’s economy, 
rather than painful and protracted structural reforms. 
The latter are usually associated with enormous 
political costs. As long as there is no strong external 
pressure and the instrument of devaluation is avail-
able, the government concerned would probably 
avoid reform efforts. A “temporary” exit from mon-
etary union is therefore not a viable way to restore 
convergence. Moreover, it is unlikely that either the 
country’s population or the rest of the euro area 
would accept the country adopting the single cur-
rency again at a later date. 
Another problem in the event of withdrawal from 
the single currency is the country’s financial liabil-
ities to the Eurosystem. For Italy, these total about 
€482.8 billion, as shown by the latest TARGET 2 
data. For France, the problem would be considerably 
smaller, since TARGET 2 liabilities of the French cen-
tral bank “only” amount to €19.8 billion. The most 
exposed central bank in the Eurosystem is the Bun-
desbank. Its TARGET 2 claims amounted to €872.7 
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billion at the end of February 2019.75 Should Italy 
decide to withdraw from monetary union, it would 
never be able to pay its liabilities. This is again due 
to the fact that a withdrawal would devalue its new 
currency whereas its debt would continue to be 
payable in euro. 
A disintegration of the euro area or the withdrawal 
of individual states would also signal the beginning of 
serious legal disputes, as there is currently no orderly 
legal procedure for this. Legal chaos and economic 
uncertainty would result. The creation of a new cur-
rency for a euro member state would be a gigantic 
logistical operation that would require at least three 
years of intensive preparations. In addition, the with-
drawal of a large euro economy would probably 
trigger a domino effect that could lead to the disinte-
gration of the monetary union. The belief in the 
irreversibility of the euro area would be destroyed, 
and confidence in the euro currency would also 
suffer. 
It can be concluded that withdrawals from the 
euro area would have a negative impact on conver-
gence. The disintegration of the monetary area would 
have negative consequences for political integration 
in Europe. None of the countries examined would 
benefit from withdrawing from the monetary union 
either. Although the national government in question 
would have regained monetary control, this advan-
tage would be outweighed by the negative economic, 
social and institutional consequences of a return to 
its own currency. 
Splitting the Euro Area into 
Two Currency Areas 
An alternative idea for strengthening the competitive-
ness of the southern states is to divide the euro area 
into two currency areas. This is based on the fre-
quently voiced assessment that the euro area consists 
of “North” and “South” blocks, and argues that the 
EU-19 should be split into these two sections.76 His-
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Eurozonen”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (online), 
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and Simon Tilford, “How the Eurozone Might Split. Could 
 
torical experience also shows that it is possible to 
break up a currency area into two or more zones. 
One example is the division of Czechoslovakia in 
1993. However, it is debatable whether such an 
option could work as intended for the euro. There are 
too many economic, political and legal obstacles that 
need to be surmounted in too short a time. As already 
mentioned, a split in the euro would destroy the most 
important foundation of monetary union, namely the 
principle of the irreversibility of the single currency. 
This could intensify speculation about the sustain-
ability of sovereign debt of some euro members. 
Moreover, the EU Treaties would have to be amended 
to lay down the new rules, which in some countries 
would require referendums. Another problem is the 
aforementioned liabilities in the Eurosystem. 
It has often been suggested that members of the 
southern euro area should leave the monetary 
union.77 From an economic point of view, however, 
an exit would be much easier for the strong econo-
mies of the North.78 This is due to their competitive-
ness, the extremely low probability that their cur-
rencies would depreciate, the stability of their bank-
ing systems, and their institutional strength. All these 
factors would make it possible to smoothly organise 
such a complex operation as the creation of a new 
currency. However, this currency would tend to 
appreciate in the stronger economies, which would 
be detrimental to their international competitiveness 
and thus to exports. For countries that base their eco-
nomic model on exports, such as Germany, this is not 
an attractive option. 
There is no question that Germany and Italy would 
find themselves in different currency systems if the 
split were to occur. However, it is unclear which camp 
France would be in. Membership in the southern euro 
would mean that the country would have to assume 
greater responsibility for Italy’s and Greece’s public 
debt and banking problems. However, participating 
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in the northern euro would also be difficult for the 
French economy, since deficit rules could be inter-
preted more strictly and other members could better 
control labour costs. If three separate monetary areas 
were created, this would also have negative conse-
quences for the integrity of the EU internal market. 
Stabilising Monetary Union with 
Limited Convergence 
A dismantling of the monetary union – whether 
controlled or uncontrolled – would pose major 
economic and political problems. Therefore the key 
question remains how the different national econo-
mies, with their different institutions and economic 
performances, can coexist under the umbrella of the 
single currency. Consideration should be given to 
how the stability of the monetary union could be 
improved when convergence processes are limited. 
Moreover, the debate on possible solutions to the 
euro crisis is strongly focused on the euro area rules. 
The search for new convergence criteria or a reform 
of the Stability and Growth Pact is the wrong way to 
go about this. Sufficient economic benchmarks have 
already been defined in the economic policy manage-
ment system of the currency area. Examples are the 
“EU 2020 Strategy” and the macroeconomic imbal-
ance procedure. However, implementation poses 
many problems in both cases, relating to the way 
some economies function within the rigid framework 
of monetary union. In this context, crucial questions 
arise regarding the capacity for reform of the largest 
economies, including fiscal transfers, sanctions 
mechanisms and financial markets, as well as further 
risk-sharing, power centralisation in the monetary 
union, and societal support for the euro project. All 
these issues are interconnected. 
Transforming Economic Models 
The analysis in the previous sections has shown that 
most of the economic problems in the euro area are 
structural in nature. Italy and France in particular 
need to adapt their economic models to changing 
global and regional competition. Italy faces the 
greatest challenges in this transformation. Because 
the country lacks the possibility of increasing its com-
petitiveness via the exchange rate, it has only one 
option: permanent strict budgetary discipline and 
structural reforms. Both paths seem to be difficult to 
follow for political reasons. Italy’s structural prob-
lems are not easily solved due to institutional weak-
nesses and the political elite’s disinterest.79 A certain 
level of financial resources is also needed to imple-
ment structural reforms and reduce institutional 
shortcomings. But, due to strict budgetary discipline 
and substantial debt servicing costs, Rome lacks the 
money. 
The literature on the diversity of capitalism con-
cludes that existing economic models are subject to 
constant change. This transformation is demonstrably 
market-oriented – a development that can be ob-
served in France and Italy in fields such as the labour 
market, social protection and product market regu-
lation since the late 1980s.80 The question remains as 
to how to steer this change in the desired direction 
and to increase the chances of success for reforms. 
The first and most important prerequisite for struc-
tural reforms and thus for encouraging convergence 
is macroeconomic stability and a positive macro-
economic environment. The more favourable the 
economic outlook, the lower the political cost of 
national reform. However, favourable economic con-
ditions are independent of the political cycle. Further-
more, even when favourable, economic conditions 
often discourage political decision makers from mak-
ing unpopular decisions. In times of economic slow-
down, the fiscal space is often limited. Structural 
rigidities, especially in the labour and product mar-
kets, then deepen the recession and make recovery 
more difficult. 
Experience shows that successful reform pro-
grammes are based on several preconditions that are 
difficult to reconcile. An extensive analysis of the 
main elements necessary for successful structural 
reform was presented by the OECD in 2009. They are 
a strong electoral mandate; effective communication 
between the political sphere and society; solid re-
search behind the reform targets; sufficient time; 
strong government cohesion; effective political 
leadership; good conditions for the policy area to 
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be reformed; and perseverance.81 It is very hard to 
achieve several of these factors simultaneously. 
Economic reforms are much easier to implement 
in small euro area member states as opposed to large 
ones. This is due to the territorial and economic com-
plexity of the respective economies. It is therefore not 
especially helpful to use the example of successful 
reforms in Ireland or Latvia for large countries. More-
over, the reforms in these two cases have had serious 
social consequences, which are still felt today. In con-
trast, the German Hartz reforms are often cited as a 
possible model in the debates on economic reforms in 
France and Italy. Both countries compiled legislative 
packages to liberalise their labour markets. In Italy, 
the Jobs Act was adopted in 2015, in France the Loi 
Macron (2015), Loi El Khomri (2016) and Loi Pénicaud 
(2017) were adopted. However, the desired results of 
these reforms are unlikely to materialise unless the 
labour market institutions are renewed, and lessons 
are drawn from the negative side effects of the Ger-
man labour market reforms (such as a division of the 
labour market into two; and increase in precarious 
employment). Recent IMF research suggests that a 
special fiscal package should be implemented to miti-
gate the negative social impact of reforms.82 However, 
this is problematic in countries struggling with exces-
sive public debt, as is the case in Italy and France. 
The European Semester has turned 
into a kind of bureaucratic routine. 
How, then, can national reforms be accelerated 
using the instruments available within the economic 
governance of the monetary area? First of all, it 
should be acknowledged that these resources only 
have a limited impact on the economic policies of 
the largest member states. 
The “European Semester”, the most important in-
strument of economic policy coordination, has turned 
into a kind of bureaucratic routine. The European 
Commission presents each member state with coun-
try-specific recommendations (CSRs), which are then 
endorsed by the European Councils and then adopted 
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by the EU finance ministers. However, the CSRs do 
not trigger much public debate about the macroeco-
nomic situation or the state of national reforms. Since 
2013, most of the country-specific recommendations 
related to Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure have 
not been sufficiently implemented.83 To strengthen 
ownership, member states have set up various bodies 
to monitor economic reforms (National Fiscal Coun-
cils and National Productivity Boards). The decentrali-
sation of this assessment is a positive catalyst for 
reform. However, it remains a challenge to limit tasks 
appropriately at each level, and to carry out checks 
and balances without unduly complicating economic 
governance.84 Besides, the largest EU economies 
should be subject to stricter surveillance, given their 
systemic importance for the euro area. The reality is 
rather different. There have been several instances 
where the Commission has put more pressure on 
smaller member states than on the larger ones. The 
experience of the European Semester also shows that 
the institutions of large member states are inward-
looking and have little interest in accepting external 
advice concerning structural reforms.85 
Reform capability of the largest 
euro countries remains uncertain – 
especially in Italy. 
However, it is questionable whether transfers of 
funds to implement reforms would be a sufficient 
incentive for the largest euro states. Germany, France 
and Italy are the largest net contributors to the EU 
budget. Cash transfers would only adjust their net 
position; they would not be significant for the macro-
economic situation. Moreover, Italy’s institutional 
weakness makes it difficult for it to draw on EU -
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cal Board and National Productivity Boards: New EMU Inde-
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funds. At end of 2016 the country had the largest pro-
portion of unabsorbed EU funds from the 2007–2013 
multiannual financial framework.86 If a member state 
is unable to pursue a proper economic policy, this 
usually has to do with a lack of ownership – and this 
cannot be “bought” with EU funds or imposed from 
Brussels. 
Sanctions are another economic policy instrument. 
This instrument was strengthened during the euro 
area crisis for use against individual member states in 
the event of inadmissible national policies. However, 
it is difficult to envisage the largest euro area coun-
tries being subject to financial sanctions. Such puni-
tive measures could also have counterproductive 
effects and strengthen Euro-sceptic movements. Both 
the European Commission and the ministers in the 
EU Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) 
are aware of the negative political consequences of 
sanctions against the largest over indebted countries. 
Another way to create incentives for reform is 
through pressure from the financial markets. During 
the crisis, interest rates on government bonds from 
France, Italy and other countries rose. This was an 
important warning signal from the financial markets; 
it showed that investors were increasingly distrustful 
of the economic prospects of these countries. How-
ever, this kind of pressure should not be overestimated. 
The negative reactions of rating agencies and inves-
tors came too late to avert the crisis. In addition, at 
some stages of the crisis, the agencies over-reacted, 
thus contributing – along with some chaotic investor 
behaviour – to the escalation of the situation. To 
date, during the euro crisis, the financial markets 
have been characterised by irrational and short-term 
thinking. Their actions service the need for quick 
profits. Furthermore, the ECB’s expansionary mon-
etary policy helped to lower government bond yields, 
which limited the “corrective” role of the financial 
markets. However, the pressure on Italian govern-
ment bonds in 2018 and 2019 played an important 
role in limiting the deficit plans of the Conte Govern-
ment. 
Whether the largest euro countries can indeed 
reform therefore remains unclear. There are pessi-
mistic predictions, especially for Italy. Institutional 
blockades, interest groups orientated towards the 
status quo and the fiscal policy of Giuseppe Conte’s 
 
86 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Italy 2019 (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2019), 140, https://doi.org/10.1787/369ec0f2-en.  
government, in office since June 2018 (tax cuts and 
higher government spending) give little cause for 
optimism. The two coalition partners, the Lega and 
the Five-Star Movement, have announced some 
reforms to the justice system and the fight against 
corruption. In the first months of its term, however, 
the government focused on fulfilling populist elec-
tion promises, including special benefits for the 
poorest sections of the population and the cancella-
tion of earlier pension reforms. The projections of 
general government deficit in April 2019 raised the 
public deficit to 2.4 percent of GDP, significantly 
higher than agreed with the European Commission 
in December 2018 (2.04 percent). The ensuing conflict 
between Rome and Brussels revealed the ineffective-
ness of the EU and euro area institutions and their 
dependence on the disciplining effects of financial 
markets.87 If the Conte government continues to relax 
fiscal policy, Italy’s financial stability will deteriorate 
and the country will experience further political 
shocks. 
France’s economy continues to face 
significant challenges, and Macron’s 
reforms should be assessed cautiously. 
The case of France is different. President Emmanuel 
Macron has been more successful with reforms than 
his predecessors, benefiting from favourable economic 
conditions. But two years after his election, there was 
growing resistance from various social groups, while 
support for the president is declining. Union protests 
against planned labour market reforms contributed 
to the sluggish growth of the French economy in mid-
2018. In the autumn of that year, there were violent 
protests by the “yellow vests”, including blockades of 
motorways and petrol stations. These events will also 
have a negative impact on economic activity. France’s 
economy continues to face significant challenges, and 
Macron’s reforms should be assessed cautiously. De-
spite their clear objective of curbing expenditure, and 
favourable economic conditions, France’s public debt 
rose to almost 100 percent of GDP at the end of 2018.88 
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Even further-reaching reforms of public finances are 
therefore not to be expected. In the coming years, 
Germany will also be confronted with the need to 
review the sustainability of its economic model. An 
attempt to partially revise the Hartz reforms could 
worsen the country’s competitiveness. This would 
probably lead to a convergence of economic perfor-
mance vis-à-vis France and Italy, but could at the 
same time call into question euro area sustainability. 
According to current forecasts, economic growth 
will develop differently in the three countries, and 
will be heavily influenced by their demographic situa-
tions. The current trends show strong divergences in 
demographic outlook between the countries. In Ger-
many the long term scenario is not very optimistic. 
According to the latest assessment by the Global 
Aging Report, between 2018 and 2070 Germany will 
have to face one of the highest increases of pension 
contributions of all EU countries (measured in terms 
of GDP).89 In France, the long-term demographic situa-
tion is expected to be significantly better than in Ger-
many and Italy, according to projections of its work-
ing-age population between 2018 and 2070.90 
How Much Centralisation of Power 
Should There Be in Monetary Union? 
For some time now, there has been discussion as to 
whether economic policy in the currency area should 
be further centralised to promote convergence be-
tween member states. This issue particularly concerns 
the largest euro area countries. They tend to prefer 
intergovernmental contacts, whereas EU institutions 
tend to use them mainly when they see an opportunity 
for self-advancement. A key area of conflict has long 
been the implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. The largest member states of the EU, France and 
Germany, diluted the rules of the Pact in 2005. Often, 
it is the larger euro area countries facing problems 
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cessed 15 April 2019). 
90 François Villeroy de Galhau, Economic Adjustments in 
Europe: The Case of France (GIC/SUERF/Deutsche Bundesbank 
Conference, Frankfurt, 8–9 February 2018). 
complying with budgetary rules that openly criticise 
the European Commission. This especially applies to 
France, where high-ranking politicians like to protest 
loudly against Brussels’ reprimands.91 Similar dissent 
can frequently be heard from politicians in Rome.92 
The intergovernmental trend has further intensi-
fied as a result of the euro crisis. During the crisis, the 
heads of state or government or the finance ministers 
of the largest member states played a key role in 
many situations. The debate on further centralisation 
of economic governance has long focused on the idea 
of creating the post of a euro area finance minister 
with the aim of addressing the biggest institutional 
challenge to monetary union: the lack of a strong 
political centre. However, member states have very 
different ideas and imperatives on this issue. France 
would use the euro area finance minister as an ad-
ministrator of the EU transfer mechanisms. This is the 
main discrepancy with Germany, which sees the key 
task of such a minister as improving budgetary disci-
pline in the euro area. Quite apart from that, how-
ever, it is difficult to imagine the member states 
agreeing to transfer decisive powers to the finance 
minister, such as those for blocking national budgets. 
It would do more harm than good to create a posi-
tion without definite competencies. The post-holder 
would be a perfect target for national populist and 
EU-sceptical politicians, and would probably be used 
as a scapegoat for economic failures at the national 
level. A better option would be to strengthen the col-
legial leadership of the euro area. In the evolution 
of monetary union, there is an example of how eco-
nomic policy interests can be efficiently reconciled 
at the supranational level: monetary policy, which 
is decided by the Governing Council of the ECB. Al-
though budgetary policy decisions (such as pension 
reforms) have much stronger political and social con-
sequences than monetary policy decisions, monetary 
policy is also a sensitive area. 
In order to strengthen collegial economic govern-
ance, the Eurogroup could develop into a kind of 
Economic Council, drawing on the experience of the 
ECB Governing Council. This Economic Council 
would have a permanent Presidency with a longer 
term and a six-member Executive Board (as is the 
 
91 “Hollande: ‘La Commission n’a pas à nous dicter ce que 
nous avons à faire’”, Le Point, 29 May 2013. 
92 Francesco Guarascio, “‘Stop Attacking EU Commission on 
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case with the ECB, and would be independent of na-
tional elections. An interesting element of the ECB’s 
decision-making process is that the size of the respec-
tive euro economies is reflected in the weighting of 
votes.93 Germany, France and Italy benefit from the 
unwritten rule that gives them a permanent presence 
on the ECB Executive Board.94 
However, one should be aware of the limitations 
of centralised decision-making. It is doubtful whether 
this would fulfil the promise of efficient decision-
making and increased convergence. Examples such as 
Ireland, Portugal or Finland show that the success of 
reforms depends above all on the extent to which the 
political classes assume responsibility at the national 
level. The efficiency of national institutions also plays 
a significant role. 
It is the interplay between the EU level and national 
policy that primarily causes problems for monetary 
union. The asymmetry of political cycles at both 
levels makes political manoeuvres more difficult. Fur-
thermore, the electoral calendar of the member states 
influences the European agenda. The succession of 
elections, especially in the large countries, reduces 
the scope for planning and implementing more com-
plex political projects. The most recent example were 
the 2017 elections to the German Bundestag, which 
were followed by a lengthy government-forming pro-
cess. As a result, political attention was severely 
restricted in the run-up to the upcoming European 
elections in 2019. The elections to state parliaments 
in Germany also have a significant impact on the for-
mulation and implementation of the agenda at the 
EU level. 
If the potential for political centralisation in the 
monetary union is limited, and yet its three largest 
economies have systemic importance, then Germany, 
France and Italy should strengthen their economic 
policy cooperation. Despite all the differences in 
European policy objectives, it is still the Franco-Ger-
man tandem that sets the political tone for integra-
tion in the euro area. Together with Italy, a kind of 
 
93 See “Rotation of voting rights in the Governing Council” 
[of the ECB], European Central Bank (online), https://www.ecb. 
europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/votingrights.en.html 
(accessed 5 February 2017). 
94 Paweł Tokarski, Die Europäische Zentralbank als politischer 
Akteur in der Eurokrise. Mandat, Stellung und Handeln der EZB in 
einer unvollständigen Währungsunion, SWP Research Paper 14/ 
2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2016). 
triumvirate has emerged that has already met twice, 
first in June 2016 in Berlin in response to the Brexit 
referendum, then in August 2016 on the Italian 
island of Ventotene. The current government in Rome 
is founded on a majority that is in opposition to the 
current EU set-up and is not an easy partner for Berlin 
and Paris. However, maintaining a dialogue is both 
possible and desirable on such issues as the labour 
market, judicial reform and the fight against corrup-
tion. If a trilateral intergovernmental exchange of 
heads of state and economic and finance ministers is 
established, this could also create a platform for con-
sultations about structural reforms at the national 
level, and for exerting the requisite peer pressure. 
However, the leaders of the two coalition parties in 
Rome would first have to acknowledge that their con-
frontational stance towards the European Commis-
sion and other members of the euro area creates a 
high risk to the stability of their own country. 
Further Risk-Sharing with 
Stronger Conditionality 
Some of the structural problems that the three states 
suffer from are deeply rooted in their economic sys-
tems. It is difficult to imagine that these obstacles 
could be overcome in a few years. A political commit-
ment to adhere to the euro can only be maintained 
in the medium term if a process of risk-sharing also 
takes place. In this context, strengthening condition-
ality is the best means for creating incentives for 
reforms at national level. The experience of the crisis 
shows that member states prefer measures that in-
volve the lowest political costs for themselves. The 
stability network of the Monetary Union has been 
significantly strengthened since the beginning of the 
euro crisis,95 but there is a broad consensus that the 
euro area is not prepared for another crisis of com-
parable magnitude. It is therefore necessary to clarify 
what concrete steps can be taken to make the euro 
area more resilient to internal and external shocks. 
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The fundamental question: 
fiscal integration or risk-sharing 
through the banking sector? 
Two fundamental positions dominate the current 
debate on further euro stabilisation. One side argues 
in favour of fiscal integration, which would be 
achieved through inter-state transfers, thereby under-
taking greater risk-sharing. The other side prefers 
decentralised fiscal responsibility and risk-sharing 
through the banking sector.96 According to the first 
stance, it is the transfer mechanisms within the mon-
etary union that should primarily be strengthened. 
President Macron has proposed creating a budget of 
several percentage points of EU-19 GDP for the euro 
area.97 A Franco-German position paper in mid-No-
vember 2018 proposed a much less ambitious instru-
ment: a budget line within the multiannual financial 
framework 2021–2027.98 Furthermore, the stabili-
sation function of this mechanism has been blocked 
by the group of Northern Euro area states led by 
Holland. 
Italy supported the idea of a euro stabilisation 
mechanism, but focused on another instrument: the 
creation of an unemployment insurance system for 
the entire monetary union.99 Its main purpose would 
be to mitigate the impact of severe economic shocks 
on employment. The US experience with a similar 
 
96 Martin Sandbu, “Banking Union v Fiscal Union, Part 2”, 
Financial Times, 15 December 2017; Anne-Laure Delatte, 
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Europe]: June 2017). 
97 See, e.g., “Emmanuel Macron: le grand entretien”, 
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tique, 26 September 2017, http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/ 
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2 October 2017). 
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2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37011/ 
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(accessed 23 November 2018). 
99 Italian Ministry of the Economy and Finance, European 
Unemployment Benefit Scheme, August 2016, http://www.mef. 
gov.it/inevidenza/documenti/Unemployment_benefit_scheme_
rev_2016.pdf (accessed 4 July 2018). 
mechanism suggests that this step could help to 
strengthen convergence in the single currency area.100 
However, since national labour market institutions in 
the euro area have different levels of efficiency, it is 
uncertain how such an instrument would work. 
Another widely debated idea in the field of fiscal 
integration concerns partial debt mutualisation. The 
basic idea is to reduce the financing costs of those 
member states which are struggling with excessive 
debt levels. In practice, this means transferring the 
refinancing costs and the associated risk from one 
group of monetary union members to another. Joint 
issuing of debt securities would be the best way to 
underpin member states’ commitment to the mon-
etary union project. It would ensure that members 
view monetary union as irreversible. The European 
Commission had already put forward the idea of such 
stability bonds in 2011, but the creditor countries in 
the currency area rejected them. The more recent pro-
posals are about creating “a European safe asset” sup-
ported by government bonds. This asset would have 
different degrees of seniority, which would mean a 
certain risk for the buyers.101 
There are two major obstacles to debt mutualisa-
tion. First, risks are transferred to all participating 
members. Second, it would mean a loss of sovereignty 
for nation states if they were subjected to stricter fis-
cal control in order to limit moral hazard. However, 
it would be possible to combine participation in a 
partial common debt issuance programme with strict 
conditionality. Participation in the issuing of debt 
securities could be reviewed annually by the Euro-
group, taking into account whether appropriate eco-
nomic policies are being pursued at national level. An 
alternative idea would be to reduce the debt burden 
of some EU-19 member states by freezing their gov-
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101 Markus K. Brunnermeier et al., ESBies: Safety in the 
Tranches, Frankfurt a.M., European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), September 2016 (Working Paper Series, Nr. 21); 
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al., Reconciling Risk-sharing with Market 
Discipline: A Constructive Approach to Eurozone Reform, Policy 
Insight no. 91 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
January 2018); ESRB, Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities: A Feasi-
bility Study (Frankfurt, January 2018), vol. 1: Main Findings. 
 Stabilising Monetary Union with Limited Convergence 
 SWP Berlin 
 Divergence and Diversity in the Euro Area 
 May 2019 
 33 
ernment bonds.102 However, this would lead to in-
direct government financing by the ECB. In any case, 
the different economic performances of the euro 
countries and the divergent development of interest 
rates on government bonds could at some point lead 
to a partial common debt issuance. 
Another option that was under discussion for sta-
bilising the monetary union is to transform the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary 
Fund (EMF). Such a fund could be used to plan and 
implement financial assistance packages, which 
would allow it to be more firmly anchored in the EU 
institutional system than the current ESM. It is ques-
tionable, however, whether this intergovernmental 
instrument would (as called for by Germany) be more 
objective than the European Commission when as-
sessing the budgetary policies of selected countries. 
The ESM is not in itself a means of increasing con-
vergence. It was set up as a rescue mechanism and is 
based on the financial risk-sharing of all 19 member 
countries. The ESM is currently one of the most im-
portant risk-sharing channels in the euro area. At the 
euro summit in June 2018, it was decided that the 
ESM should assume the role of backstop for the Single 
Resolution Fund.103 A common backstop would re-
duce the risk of contagion in the banking sector and 
the likelihood of risks being transferred from one 
country to another. In addition, the activation of an 
ESM programme requires the approval of a number of 
national parliaments, including the Bundestag. This 
process takes time. Crisis experience shows that the 
more time it takes to agree a package, the more costly 
it becomes. The Eurogroup decision of 4 December 
2018 on the ESM precautionary credit line is a step in 
the right direction for at least two reasons.104 First, the 
ESM would be used for financial support at an early 
stage. Second, the establishment of ex-ante conditions 
can serve as an incentive for member states to pursue 
sound economic policies in the framework of the 
European Semester. However, one should also be 
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aware of the financial limitations of the mechanism. 
At the beginning of 2018, the ESM credit capacity was 
up to €410 billion.105 This would not be sufficient for 
creating a comprehensive financial assistance pro-
gramme for just one of the three largest members of 
the euro area. Thus, an increase in the volume of ESM 
lending should be seriously considered. In the oppo-
site case, the ECB will continue to be the only institu-
tion capable of assisting the largest member states in 
case of difficulties in servicing their own debts. 
The second view in the debate on euro stabilisation 
is, as mentioned, decentralised fiscal policy. This posi-
tion argues against the claim that fiscal integration, 
including tax transfers, is necessary for the euro to 
survive. The arguments favouring a fiscal union, it 
maintains, were based on a misinterpretation of how 
existing currency areas function, and especially the 
nature of risk-sharing. The example of the USA shows 
that risk-sharing takes place largely via the financial 
markets and not via fiscal channels.106 The sustaina-
bility of the euro area therefore does not depend on 
a central budget, but on the strength of the financial 
market institutions and the completion of the flag-
ship banking union project.107 
Non-performing loans remain 
the biggest challenge facing the 
European banking sector. 
This particularly applies to the development of 
the third pillar of the Banking Union, the European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). Even countries 
from the north of the monetary union, such as Fin-
land, are now seeing more and more advantages from 
the common deposit guarantee system.108 The large 
volume of non-performing loans in the banking sec-
tor, especially in Italy, remains the biggest challenge 
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facing the European banking sector. On the positive 
side, this issue remains high on the EU’s political 
agenda.109 Yet the process of reducing non-performing 
loans takes time, as does continuously improving 
economic conditions in the single currency area as 
well as the efficiency of national institutions. Con-
ditions could be attached to it, pooling risks in the 
banking sector through EDIS. At the start of the 
process, EDIS could cover 30 percent of the losses of 
the relevant national insurance system, as proposed 
by the Commission.110 The percentage of mutualisa-
tion could be linked to appropriate benchmarks, 
analogous to risk elimination in the banking sector. 
An annual assessment that offers incentives to reduce 
non-performing loans in the banking sector is con-
ceivable. A similar conditionality has been attached 
to the ESM providing a backstop to the Single Resolu-
tion Fund. It should be remembered that the smooth 
functioning of the banking union and the elimina-
tion of links between banks and states require a pro-
found change in the business model of the Italian 
banking sector, which relies strongly on individual 
investors. The liquidation of the insolvent banks 
Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza in 2017 
was secured by the state for fear of losses for small 
investors and was subject to national insolvency law. 
Another important issue is the possible introduc-
tion of rules on the debt restructuring of euro area 
member states. A Bundesbank report has proposed 
that the ESM should play a leading role in any debt 
restructuring process. It also calls for the creation of 
an automatic mechanism to extend the maturity of 
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government bonds, and for changes to the standard-
ised terms and conditions of government bonds 
issued by euro area member states to facilitate debt 
restructuring.111 This could lead to the private sector 
assuming part of the cost of financial support. But 
there is a risk that entering into a financial assistance 
programme might increase market volatility rather 
than alleviate an already tense situation.112 Moreover, 
this solution would contribute to increased market 
pressure in some economies, as investors would have 
to take into account an increased risk of default. This 
could affect Italy in particular, where, as mentioned 
above, most of the public debt is held by domestic 
creditors. 
Given the complexity and political sensitivity of 
further risk-sharing, the ECB is expected to continue 
playing the crucial role in stabilising the monetary 
union if risks in the euro area increase further. ECB 
President Mario Draghi committed himself to this role 
in a speech in July 2012. The ECB’s Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) programme includes robust re-
quirements for the implementation of reforms. How-
ever, monetary policy also has its limitations. The 
balance sheet of the Eurosystem stood at over 40 per-
cent of euro area GDP in April 2019, significantly 
higher than the US Federal Bank’s (19 percent). The 
question is whether the stabilisation objective of 
monetary union will always be compatible with the 
ECB’s main objective, price stability. Another option 
would be to redefine how inflation is assessed. The 
current quantitative target of below but close to 2 per-
cent was set in 1998 and 2003 by the Governing Coun-
cil of the ECB – which could change it. The problem 
of how to determine an optimal inflation target and 
the best possible monetary policy is increasingly 
being discussed in academia. The ECB is trying to pre-
pare the public for this debate as well.113 
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Social Support for the Euro Project 
Public support for the common euro rarely plays a 
role in the analyses of the stability of Economic and 
Monetary Union. However, the attitude of the popu-
lation is likely to be crucial for the future of mon-
etary integration. The social problems that have 
worsened in some countries during the crisis will 
continue to have a negative impact on national 
policies. It is difficult to predict how governments 
that are formed or influenced by populist parties will 
behave. This creates a political risk which also in-
creases uncertainty about the future of the euro. 
Public support for monetary union is highest in high-
income countries. Countries that have experienced 
high growth since the introduction of the euro have 
also tended to see increasing support for the single 
currency.114 In this respect, the stability of the euro 
area requires social aspects of economic and mon-
etary union to be taken into account. The extent to 
which the euro is supported by the population is 
directly related to these factors, which in turn are 
related to the real convergence of the economies 
within the currency area. 
Low support for the euro is a particular problem 
in Italy. At the beginning of Economic and Monetary 
Union, there was still a great deal of support: back in 
the early 2000s, Italians were among the most enthu-
siastic supporters of the euro and of European inte-
gration in general. The population was convinced 
that the euro and the European institutions were 
more efficient and more democratic than their na-
tional counterparts.115 Subsequently, euro scepticism 
gradually increased in Italy, mainly due to poor im-
plementation of the currency introduction in 2002.116 
Table 2 (p. 36) shows how public support for the 
euro has developed in Germany, France, Italy and 
the EU-28 as a whole since the beginning of the crisis. 
The most important reason for the current lack of 
euro approval in Italy is its tense economic and social 
 
114 IMF, Eurozone Policies, Selected Issues, 25 July 2017, IMF 
Country Report no. 17/236 (Washington, D.C., 2017), 5. 
115 Thomas Risse, “The Euro between National and 
European Identity”, Journal of European Public Policy 10, no. 4 
(2003): 487–505 (497). 
116 At the time, retailers and restaurants used the currency 
exchange to raise prices – a move that the right-wing popu-
list Lega Nord used as an argument against the euro. 
situation, especially high unemployment.117 Public 
debate in the country often argues that the euro and 
the inability to devalue have destroyed Italy’s com-
petitiveness.118 Simultaneously, there is a direct link 
between unemployment and support for anti-system 
and EU-critical parties.119 Nevertheless, in all three 
countries the number of euro supporters is greater 
than that of opponents. The pro camp is particularly 
large in Germany. In Italy, too, support for the euro 
is once again increasing, because – despite every-
thing – the economic situation is improving. Overall, 
though, the number of supporters in Italy is still one 
of the lowest of all euro area countries, which repre-
sents a risk factor for the monetary union. 
There is a danger that the euro will once again be 
made a scapegoat for economic problems as soon as 
the economy weakens. It is therefore important to 
further develop the social pillar of economic integra-
tion in the euro area. Significant progress has already 
been made in this area, while the need for genuine 
convergence in the euro area has been increasingly 
discussed. Examples are the Joint Employment Report 
or the inclusion (in 2014) of social indicators in the 
Alert Mechanism Report. The debate on reforms of 
the monetary union focuses strongly on the integra-
tion of financial markets, the banking union or the 
European Monetary Fund. These issues seem very 
abstract to ordinary citizens who do not see a direct 
link between their situation and the regulation of 
financial institutions. The fact that the social dimen-
sion of monetary integration has gained in impor-
tance in recent years could counteract this detach-
ment. In 2017, it was announced that a new pillar 
of social rights would be created in the euro area, 
relating to 20 non-binding social principles. The aim 
is to promote convergence in the fields of em-
 
117 Felix Roth, Lars Jonung and Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann, 
“Public Support for the Euro”, VOX CEPR’s Policy Portal, 11 No-
vember 2016, https://voxeu.org/article/public-support-euro 
(accessed 4 July 2018); Philip Giurlando, Eurozone Politics. Per-
ception and Reality in Italy, the UK, and Germany (London and 
New York, 2016). 
118 See Gavin Jones, “Out of Pocket, Italians Fall Out of 
Love with the Euro”, Reuters, 8 February 2017, http://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-italy-exit-analysis-idUSKBN15 
N0JJ (accessed 3 July 2018). 
119 See Yann Algan et al., “The European Trust Crisis and 
the Rise of Populism”, VOX CEPR’s Policy Portal, 12 December 
2017, https://voxeu.org/article/european-trust-crisis-and-rise-
populism (accessed 4 July 2018). 
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ployment. The euro area needs a concrete flagship 
programme focusing on the labour market – the 
most important issue for citizens. Fragmentation and 
the incompatibility of national social systems are the 
main obstacles if social policy is to be developed at 
EU level. Unemployment benefits, for example, are 
granted for different periods and depend on the level 
of wages.120 An option would be to introduce an in-
strument such as the German short-time working 
allowance, which could contribute to the stimulation 
and flexibility of the labour market. 
 
 
 
120 Peter Becker, Europas soziale Dimension. Die Suche nach der 
Balance zwischen europäischer Solidarität und nationaler Zustän-
digkeit, SWP-Studie, SWP Research Paper 21/2015 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2015), 27ff. 
Table 2 
Public support for the euro, 2010–2018 (%) 
 Nov.  
2010 
Nov.  
2011 
Nov.  
2012 
Nov.  
2013 
Nov.  
2014 
Nov.  
2015 
Nov.  
2016 
Nov.  
2017 
Nov. 
2018 
Italy 68 57 57 53 54 55 53 59 63 
France 69 63 69 63 67 67 68 71 72 
Germany 67 66 69 71 73 73 81 80 81 
EU-28 58 53 53 53 56 56 58 61 62 
Source: European Commission, Public Opinion. 
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∎ France, Italy and Germany differ considerably 
from each other in terms of state participation in 
the economy, their national growth models and 
the efficiency of their state institutions. The eco-
nomic divergence between the three countries is 
largely the result of their economic models, which 
have evolved over decades and which react differ-
ently to the conditions of the monetary union and 
to economic fluctuations. There are major struc-
tural problems in Italy and France, both of which 
face a lack of competitiveness and excessive debt. 
∎ Italy suffers from institutional weaknesses, public 
debt, risks in the banking sector, a tense social 
situation and polarisation between the north and 
south of the country. The problems are so serious 
that they pose a risk to the stability of the mon-
etary union as a whole. This risk has increased sig-
nificantly since the formation in Rome of a govern-
ment coalition of the Lega and the Five-Star Move-
ment. Nevertheless, political contacts between all 
the largest economies of the euro area should be 
strengthened, especially in the area of economic 
policy. It is important to involve the Italian gov-
ernment in a constructive dialogue at ministerial 
and state level as soon as the political leadership in 
Rome realises that its policy of confrontation with 
Brussels brings more costs than benefits. 
∎ The German economic model is successful, especially 
in comparison to the French and Italian models. 
The greatest challenge facing Germany is to suc-
cessfully secure its own growth potential for the 
future. In order to deal with this, Germany should 
use its fiscal and economic leeway to increase pub-
lic investment and wages. At the same time, struc-
tural reforms should be implemented in France 
and Italy in order to increase the competitiveness 
of both countries. The negative demographics in 
Italy and Germany must also be dealt with. 
∎ Limited convergence cannot be addressed either by 
increased federalisation of the euro area or by dis-
mantling European integration. In theory, the Ital-
ian and French economies could be more competi-
tive outside the euro area. However, for both coun-
tries the economic and social costs of leaving the 
euro would be enormous. The consequence would 
be the depreciation of their new national curren-
cies against the euro. This could lead to state in-
solvency. Withdrawing from the euro area or its 
general disintegration are not reasonable options. 
It should be remembered that an exit scenario 
would not necessarily be the result of a conscious 
political decision, but could result from an uncon-
trollable, self-reinforcing process. All three major 
euro area countries should better inform their citi-
zens about the economic, social and political conse-
quences of the disintegration of the currency block. 
∎ There is no simple solution for strengthening the 
stability of a monetary union with limited conver-
gence. The discussion in the euro area should not 
be based on the model of a federal state and derive 
from it the need for a euro finance minister or its 
own budget. The euro area is a sui generis con-
struction. Due to the strong intergovernmental ten-
dencies within it, further centralisation of power 
(such as with a finance minister) is likely to bring 
more disadvantages than advantages. Instead, con-
sideration should be given to strengthening colle-
gial economic governance at European level, along 
the lines of the Governing Council of the ECB. Fur-
ther stabilisation of the monetary union also re-
quires greater institutional efficiency at the national 
level, and more ownership of national reforms 
within the framework of the European Semester. 
∎ The current economic governance instruments 
have limited efficiency. This should be taken into 
account in the discussion on economic policy 
reform in the euro area. It is also worth consider-
ing strengthening macroeconomic surveillance 
of the largest economies on a permanent basis, as 
they have a systemic significance for the monetary 
union as a whole. Germany, France and Italy 
should also intensify their trilateral intergovern-
mental cooperation on economic policy issues. 
However, differences in electoral cycles at the 
national level and the increasing fragmentation 
of the party systems represent a major obstacle 
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to efficient political cooperation between Berlin, 
Paris and Rome. 
∎ There may be a need for additional risk-sharing 
paths in the monetary union. The banking union 
should be progressively completed through the 
introduction of the common deposit-guarantee 
scheme. A partial issuing of euro bonds should also 
be considered. New risk-sharing channels should 
be linked to conditionality: how well a country 
performs in reforms within the framework of the 
European Semester should be the decisive factor. 
∎ The most promising reform element is to extend 
the tasks of the ESM. Within the euro area, there 
seems to be a general consensus for taking action 
in this area. The future development of the ESM 
into a European Monetary Fund must be accompa-
nied by an adequate lending capacity and more 
automatism in granting financial assistance. 
∎ It is nevertheless important to be aware of the limi-
tations placed on the instruments of economic gov-
ernance in the euro area. Financial sanctions or 
financial transfers cannot replace national owner-
ship of reforms. 
∎ Stabilisation of the euro area must not overlook 
the social aspect, even though social policy will 
remain the responsibility of member states for the 
foreseeable future, and even though social systems 
within the EU-19 are very heterogeneous. In par-
ticular, it is important to strengthen public support 
for the euro. The social pillar of the euro area has 
gained momentum in recent months. Considera-
tion should be given to creating a showcase proj-
ect, for instance a European short-time allowance. 
∎ In the context of limited convergence and a lack of 
stabilisation mechanisms in the euro area, the ECB 
may again be forced to play a decisive role in sta-
bilising the currency area. This particularly applies 
to how the situation develops in Italy. But the 
monetary union model based on monetary stabili-
sation is not sustainable. 
∎ In the ongoing debate on euro area reforms, the 
internal challenges of its three largest economies 
should be given greater attention. If divergence in-
creases significantly, their willingness to share risk 
would be correspondingly reduced. This would 
jeopardise the whole euro project. The future of 
European economic integration will therefore 
depend on the success or failure of national eco-
nomic policies in France, Germany and Italy. 
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Abbreviations 
AMR Alert Mechanism Report 
CME Coordinated Market Economies 
CSR Country Specific Recommendations 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECOFIN Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
EDIS European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union 
ESM European Stability Mechanism 
EU European Union 
EU-19 Eurozone with 19 Member States 
EU-28 European Union with 28 Member States 
G7 Group of the seven major advanced economies 
G20 Group of the twenty most important industrialised 
and emerging economies 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
MIP Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
MME Mediterranean Market Economies 
NEET Not in Education, Employment or Training 
NPLs Non-Performing Loans 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OMT Outright Monetary Transactions (ECB Bond 
Purchasing Programme) 
REER Real Effective Exchange Rate 
SGP Stability and Growth Pact 
TARGET Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer System 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
